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TOWARD LESS MONOPOLY
Ward S. Bowman, Jr. t
Acceptance of the importance of economics in antitrust law has
become widespread. The. Association of American Law Schools has
sponsored economic studies to supplement legal teaching materials;
practicing lawyers increasingly are seeking economic aid in preparing
for antitrust litigation; and recently a federal judge has obtained the as-
sistance of a trained economist for a major Sherman Act case. In addi-
tion economics has an equally important role in determining what the
law should be.
This article is directed toward the achievement of more effective
anti-monopoly standards. The central objective of the study is ascer-
taining how to achieve more effective competition than now exists.
There is a close connection between existing law and economic knowl-
edge about monopoly. This connection makes possible a recommenda-
tion of legal standards for determining the existence of illegal monopoly
based upon the foundation of existing law-particularly upon Judge
Hand's decision in the Aluminum Company case.
The first three sections of this article develop the basis of a stand-
ard for determining illegality under section 2 of the Sherman Act, set
out the standard and relate it to the problem of efficiency (economies
of scale), and indicate the nature of the efficiency problem in a par-
ticular major industry-steel. The last three sections contain analysis
of alternative methods of attacking the monopoly problem. Therein
are considered various performance tests which have been suggested,
the question of whether and under what circumstances there can be said
to be too much competition, and the question of what "workable" com-
petition has to offer as a guide to public policy.
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I. THE STEEL INDUSTRY AND THE ALCOA CASE
The steel industry has often been cited as a proper object of an
anti-monopoly program. Although today there are a number of in-
dustries with considerably higher concentration ratios, either in terms
of percentage of assets or in terms of percentage of production by a few
large producers, of all industries steel is probably the most thoroughly
investigated for indications of monopoly. Ever since the spectacular
mergers which culminated in the formation of the United States Steel
Corporation in 1901, the steel industry in general, and the United States
Steel Corporation in particular, have periodically been the subject of
Congressional or administrative investigation. Each of these major
investigations has found what have been considered to be serious
departures from effective competitive behavior. In the critical legal
contests, however, the steel industry has an imposing record. Its most
significant victory was in the dissolution suit brought against United
States Steel and decided adversely for the government by the Supreme
Court in 1920.1
Since this case, the concept of illegal monopoly has undergone
rather substantial change. Particularly, there has been a marked de-
velopment in the definition of monopolization under section 2 of the
Sherman Act.2 This change has been summarized by Chief Judge
Knox in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America: 3
".. . a marked development in the application of the anti-trust
laws has been the diminishing significance attributable to the
presence of actually abusive practices in the exercise of a corpora-
tion's market power. Courts formerly looked to an overt misuse
of a defendant's dominant competitive position as a sine qua non
of illegality.' But this is no longer true. The more recent au-
thoritative precedents indicate that the mere existence of what is
denominated 'monopoly power,' irrespective of its exercise, may be
the focal element that will resolve the outcome of a particular suit."
This interpretation of monopolizing under section 2 supersedes
the opinion in the 1920 steel case only insofar as the absence of abuses
1. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
2. 26 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1946) : "Every person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .
3. 91 F. Supp. 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
4. Judge Knox claims too much here. To hold that the misuse of a dominant
competitive position has been an indispensable requirement for illegality under § 2
stresses the importance of United States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 1,
to the exclusion of the other combination cases. The railroad cases cited by Judge
Hand provide clear examples of illegally acquired power regardless of the use fuade
of it. Narrowing the "how obtained" requirement to a narrow exception marks the
more significant step in monopoly law.
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is assumed to be the critical issue in a determination of the presence
of illegal monopoly. In the Alcoa case Judge Learned Hand addressed
himself to the question of what proportion a single producer must oc-
cupy in the market before an illegal power presumption can become
applicable. His widely quoted words are: "That percentage [over 90]
is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or
sixty-four per cent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent
is not." '
The U.S. Steel Corporation at the time the steel case was tried
produced some 50 per cent of the basic steel (ingots) made in the
United States. This percentage does not create a presumption of
illegality under the Hand interpretation of section 2 since it is well
below the lower limit (64 per cent) which he emphasized. Moreover,
the presumptive legality of the amount of power held by the United
States Steel Corporation is strengthened by Attorney General Clark's
approval of the post-World War II disposal of the Geneva Steel plant
to U. S. Steel, and by the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v.
Columbia Steel Corp.,' where the issue involved was the propriety under
the Sherman Act of the acquisition of the Consolidated Steel Corpora-
tion by U. S. Steel.
Although the steel cases may be consistent with respect to Judge
Hand's opinion in terms of power as measured by the percentage rule
he laid down, it is not so clear that the results in the steel cases are con-
sistent with the theory by which his power rule was developed. This is
apart from the questions which can be raised as to illegality based on
intent to monopolize.7 Both monopolizing and attempting to monop-
olize are encompassed by section 2.
Judge Hand's "Power Rule"
Judge Hand builds his power rule by analogy to the price fixing
cases:
"It is settled, at least as to § 1, that there are some contracts
restricting competition which are unlawful, no matter how benefi-
cient they may be; no industrial exigency will justify them; they
are absolutely forbidden. . . . Starting . . . with the author-
itative premise that all contracts fixing prices are unconditionally
prohibited, the only possible difference between them and a monop-
oly is that while a monopoly necessarily involves an equal, or even
5. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945).
6. 334 U.S. 495, rehtearing denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948).
7. Calculated schemes to gain control over an appreciable segment of the market
and to suppress competition run afoul of the Sherman Act. See United States
v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948).
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greater, power to fix prices, its mere existence might be thought
not to constitute an exercise of that power. That distinction is
nevertheless purely formal; it would be valid only so long as the
monopoly remained wholly inert; it would disappear as soon as the
monopoly began to operate; for, when it did-that is, as soon as it
began to sell at all-it must sell at some price and the only price at
which it could sell is a price which it itself fixed. Thereafter the
power and its exercise must needs coalesce. Indeed it would be
absurd to condemn such contracts unconditionally, and not to
extend the condemnation to monopolies; for the contracts are only
steps toward that entire control which monopoly confers; they are
really partial monopolies." 8
Why is not Judge Hand's rule, since it is derived from the price
fixing cases, that any degree of power held by a single firm is illegal if
that same power would be illegal if jointly held by several firms in a
price ring? An answer involves more than precedent. To so hold
would be to classify everything as a monopoly, for, as Hand points
out, a price fixing agreement is illegal irrespective of the degree of
economic power. On the other hand, if price fixers in agreement are at
all rational, their very acts of setting prices are a clear indication that
they expect to exert economic power in a monopolistic manner. There
is no reasonable alternative inference than that they specifically intend
to monopolize. Intent would seem to be at least as satisfactory a com-
mon term as power in an analogy between price fixing and monopoly.
Hand himself points out: "Although in many settings it may be proper
to weigh the extent and effect of restrictions in a contract against its
industrial or commercial advantages, this is never to be done when the
contract is made with intent to set up a monopoly." 9 (Emphasis
added.)
Judge Hand's concept of monopoly in the Alcoa 10 case seems to
approximate entire control. Section 1 contracts (such as price fixing
agreements) he says "are really partial monopolies." But these partial
monopolies which are represented by price rings and other forms of
loose associations are in terms of power no less "partial monopolies"
than a similar aggregation of control in a single firm. The only differ-
ence between the price fixing case and a single firm with a similar
degree of "partial monopoly" is, as Hand points out with respect to
more complete monopolies, that in the latter case "its mere existence
might be thought not to constitute an exercise of that power.":" He
8. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427-428 (2d Cir.
1945).
9. Id. at 428.
10, But contrast his opinion in the Corn Products case, infra note 12.
11. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir.
1945).
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then goes on to indicate that this last distinction is merely formal and
is valid only as long as the monopoly (also true of partial monopoly
although not specifically included by Judge Hand) remains wholly
inert. The distinction disappears as soon as the monopoly begins to
sell at all-it must sell at some price and the only price at which it can
sell is a price which it itself fixes.
From this reasoning it might be concluded that monopoly power
exists when any seller or group of sellers may by its own action cause
a substantial change in the market price (either by direct action on
price or through control of output, which must affect price). Such a
conclusion would abandon entire control as a workable meaning of
monopoly; and Hand's analogy to price fixing cases, insofar as it is
valid in terms of power, seems to provide argument for doing so. The
real power to monopolize is the power to fix prices. Emphasis prior
to the Alcoa case was on how power was acquired. As Judge Hand
pointed out as long ago as 1916 in United States v. Corn Products
Refining Co.: "If the decisions of the Supreme Court are to be so
understood, it is the mere possession of economic power, acquired by
some form of combination, and capable, by its own variation in produc-
tion, of changing and controlling price, that is illegal." 12
It is notable that in the Corn Products case the proportion of the
market in glucose and corn starch controlled by the defendants was only
slightly more than 50 per cent in 1914 and was declining. Moreover
in the Addyston Pipe & Steel case,' in the Reading case-4 and in the
Lehigh case, 5 the proportions of business done by the defendants '"
were 30, 33 and 20. The Reading case,17 along with the Southern
Pacific '8 and Union Pacific cases,' 9 are among the cases cited by Judge
Hand in the Alcoa opinion to establish the point that if the Aluminum
Company of America, which produced 90 per cent of the primary
virgin aluminum in the United States, had been formed by combination
its monopoly position would be illegal." These cases would seem to
provide equally valid precedent for a "partial monopoly" rule con-
siderably below the 90 per cent control present in the Alcoa case. In
12. 234 Fed. 964, 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
13. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
14. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26 (1920).
15. United States v. Lehigh Valley Ry., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
16. Per cent of United States market. (Local control was considerably higher).
17. Supra note 14.
18. United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214 (1922).
19. United States v. Union Pacific Ry., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
20. Supra note 5, at 429. Unless, in Hand's language, monopoly is "thrust
upon it." Ibid. See Section III, infra.
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fact in the Reading case,2 which was decided within seven weeks of
the Steel Co.2" decision of 1920, and in which was represented a com-
bination involving only about one-third of the anthracite coal produc-
tion in a narrowly defined producing region, the court refers to the
position of Reading as "this dominating power," and says "(t) hat such
a power, so obtained, regardless of the use made of it, constitutes a
menace to and an undue restraint upon interstate commerce within the
meaning of the Anti-Trust Act.. ,, 23 Again, the emphasis may
be said to be on "so obtained" rather than on "power."
Hand's statement to the effect that 90 per cent control is enough
to constitute monopoly, that it is doubtful whether 60 to 64 per cent
would be enough, and that certainly 33 per cent would not be enough,
is not necessary for the holding in the Alcoa case. The combination
cases, which provide Judge Hand with examples of monopoly power,
involved percentages of control well below the limits of 64 to 90 per
cent. Judge Hand adopted a different and much higher standard for
illegality in terms of power in the Aluminum case than he himself had
required of the combination in the Corn Products case.24
Setting any percentage of market control as a standard of presump-
tive illegality must, of course, be somewhat arbitrary. In addition to
the problem of what the percentage should be, it leaves unsolved per-
plexing questions such as "33, 60, or 90 per cent of what?". It leaves
considerable room for the ingenuity of lawyers and judges to determine
both the product category which is applicable and the geographic scope
of the market to be considered. The provisions of sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act have both a geographic and product diversity sig-
nificance. They apply to any part of the United States and to any of the
classes of things that enter into interstate commerce.Y This is the
problem of prescribing the industry to which any percentage rule is to
apply. Judge Hand was confronted with the problem of what to in-
clude in the aluminum industry in the Alcoa case. He concluded that
secondary aluminum was not properly included in the base from which
the Aluminum Company's percentage of control was measured. It is
obvious that he also concluded that it was not appropriate to include
other light metals in measuring Alcoa's market control. Similar prob-
21. Suepra note 14.
22. Supra note 1.
23. United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 54 (1920).
24. It must be noted that all of these cases involved combination. It was not
primarily the percentages of control that made for illegality, but they were deemed
relevant by Judge Hand in deciding the Alcoa case, which did not involve combina-
tion. It is difficult to see why they would not have been equally relevant had the
percentage of Alcoa's production of aluminum ingot been substantially lower.
25. See Indiana Farmer's Guide Publishing Co. v. Prairie Farmer Publishing
Co., 293 U.S. 268, 279 (1934).
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lems are always present in monopoly cases irrespective of what per-
centage of control is deemed to be crucial. The doubts raised about
Judge Hand's 64 to 90 per cent rule for determining presumptive
illegality present a separate problem.
Moreover, even with a 90 per cent rule Judge Hand stresses that
the standard is only presumptive. This presumption may be rebutted
by a showing by the monopolist that monopoly has been "thrust
upon it."
II. "MoNoPoLY THRUST LrpoN"-EcoNoMrIEs OF SCALE
"Having proved," said Judge Hand in United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, "that 'Alcoa' had a monopoly of the domestic ingot
market, the plaintiff had gone far enough; if it was an excuse, that
'Alcoa' had not abused its power, it lay upon 'Alcoa' to prove that it had
not. But the whole issue is irrelevant anyway, for it is no excuse for
'monopolizing' a market that the monopoly had not been used to extract
from the consumer more than a 'fair' profit." 28
Judge Hand's statement is unquestionably true:
". . . from the very outset courts have at least kept in reserve
the possibility that the origin of the monopoly may be critical in
determining its legality. . .. This notion has usually been ex-
pressed by saying that size does not determine guilt; that there
must be some 'exclusion' of competitors; that the growth must be
something else than 'natural' or 'normal'; that there must be a
'wrongful intent,' or some other specific intent; or that some 'un-
duly' coercive means must be used. At times there has been em-
phasis upon the use of the active verb, 'monopolize,'. . . . What
engendered these compunctions is reasonably plain . . . persons
may unwittingly find themselves in possession of a monopoly, au-
tomatically so to say: that is, without having intended either to
put an end to existing competition, or to prevent competition from
arising when none had existed; they may become monopolists by
force of accident. Since the Act makes 'monopolizing' a crime, as
well as a civil wrong, it would be not only unfair, but presumably
contrary to the intent of Congress, to include such instances. A
market may, for example, be so limited that it is impossible to
produce at all and meet the cost of production except by a plant
large enough to supply the whole demand. Or there may be
changes in taste or in cost which drive out all but one purveyor. A
single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active com-
petitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and in-
dustry. In such cases a strong argument can be made that, al-
though the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly,
the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very
26. 148 F.2d 416, 427 (1945).
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forces which it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat.
The successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not
be turned upon when he wins." 27
This quotation from Judge Hand's opinion provides the rationale for
the holding that monopoly, regardless of how powerful, is not illegal
per se. Thus, even the 90 per cent control over aluminum ingot in the
Alcoa case creates merely a presumption of illegal monopoly because
"it may not have achieved monopoly; monopoly may have been thrust
upon it." 28
In applying this rule to the Aluminum Company in the Alcoa case,
Judge Hand gave a very restricted meaning to the phrase "thrust upon
it." For example, Judge Hand, in commenting on the fact that Alcoa
had stimulated new demand and opened up new uses for aluminum and
then avowed it as evidence of the skill, energy and initiative with which
it conducted its business, said: "we may assume that all it claims for
itself is true. The only question is whether it falls within the exception
established in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the
control of a market." 29 (Emphasis added.)
The passive proposition "thrust upon it" is strictly and literally
applied in the Alcoa case. This application, however, does not neces-
sarily exclude the defense of the successful competitor, who, having
been urged to compete, is turned upon when he wins. If "thrust upon"
were to include only "passive" cases no rebuttal of a presumption of
monopoly would be possible for other than inert business firms. But
how can "a single producer who may be the survivor out of a group of
active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and
industry" be said to behave so as to have had monopoly thrust upon
him? It is this kind of circumstance, says Judge Hand, which provides
the reason for requiring a rule making a presumption of monopoly
rebuttable. Judge Hand's answer is by example. He seems principally
concerned with natural monopolies-industries which support or are
likely to support only single firms for reasons of efficiency (economies
of scale). Judge Hand unquestionably had economies of scale in mind
when he said, "A market may, for example, be so limited that it is
impossible to produce at all and meet the costs of production except
by a plant large enough to supply the whole demand." 80
27. Id. at 429.
28. Ibid.
29. Id. at 431.
30. Id. at 430. It is interesting to note that the word "plant" rather than "com-
pany" is used. Could monopoly be "thrust upon" a multi-plant company, especially
if not brought about by merger?
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Another of the examples which Judge Hand quotes as providing
possible rebuttable evidence against what is presumed to be illegal
monopoly relates to "changes in taste or in cost which drive out all but
one purveyor." "I The reference in this connection fits the general
economic prescription of the industry which may become a natural
monopoly although past or present conditions did not or do not make
this inevitable.
A case of monopoly "thrust upon" would also seem to arise when
an enterprising seller brings forth for the first time a new product or
a new service. For at least a short period of time such a seller is
likely to have the market to himself. So limited, this is not dissimilar
to the natural monopoly point. That this sort of monopoly should
result in a violation of the Sherman Act would serve no useful purpose
and might well provide an effective damper on an important phase of
competition. Professor Schumpeter, especially, stresses this aspect of
competition (which is discussed in section IV of this article)."2
Still another possibility of a monopoly thrust upon a seller arises
from the possession of unique skills or special knowledge. The posses-
sion of the best brains, or the keenest foresight, or the most complete
know-how can be viewed as a particular kind of economy of scale.
On the other hand, if such an advantage should persist it might be
difficult to square such a result with the exception described by Judge
Hand "in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the con-
trol of a market." At least, in the Alcoa case that skill in stimulating
new demands and opening up new uses could not rebut the presump-
tion of illegal monopoly in aluminum.
Irrespective of what the law is or what the law turns out to be
about "monopoly thrust upon it," it is possible to limit the coverage
of the exception principally to problems which in economics are covered
by the general term "economies of scale." Here is the most important
reason for not having a per se rule against any substantial degree of
monopoly power irrespective of the source of power. It is concern
over this efficiency exception which gives rise to the difficult public
policy questions of providing for adequate relief in antitrust cases in
a manner consistent with those purposes of the Act which Judge Hand
has outlined. Apart from problems arising from economies of scale
there would seem to be no more reason for tolerating economic power
held by single concerns than for tolerating similar power aggregated
through loose associations such as cartels.
31. Ibid.
32. See text at note 122 infra.
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The importance of Judge Hand's power rule as legal precedent
arises from the fact that he recognizes that economic power, in and
of itself, irrespective of how it has been obtained or how it is used, can
be illegal. The "thrust upon it" exception to the rule safeguards ap-
plication to monopoly arising from efficiency-economy of scale. Ap-
plication need not logically be restricted to the single dominant seller
with 64 to 90 per cent of an industry's production.
Economies of Scale
There are industries in which a market is served economically by
only one or a few sellers. It is generally considered to be wasteful
socially to duplicate electric power facilities in the same community.
This is a typical public utility case. In such industries even two pro-
ducers of the same service for the same market cannot possibly have
as low unit costs as one., Productive resources in these industries are
not economically divisible. Resources must be provided in large
"chunks." 34 The economy of scale case involves costs which decline
with increases in output over so wide a range that the market will
not support more than one (or a few) firms of efficient size. Under
such circumstances only does competition necessarily lead to monop-
oly."5 It is this case that gives rise to the necessity of a "thrust upon
it" exception to a monopoly power rule.
Properly defined, the economy of scale case relates to social costs,
not to private costs. Social costs are costs which the community as a
whole pays. They are reduced by economical utilization of scarce re-
sources. Cost advantages accruing to particular business firms do
not necessarily involve reduction of social cost. For example, a strong
bargaining advantage, giving rise to preferential discounts in purchas-
ing materials or services, represents cost savings to the firm obtaining
it, but does not conserve resources.
Recognition of the importance of economies of scale in some par-
ticular area need not result in condoning wide areas of monopoly.
(w)hen the tendency toward diminishing cost is as-
signable to economies prior to or subsequent to the particular
manufacturing process-economies, therefore, external to the in-
dividual concern, and thus available to any concern of whatever
size in proportion to that size-competition need not end in mo-
nopoly. Thus, a better organization of the market in which raw
33. The analysis is not changed by applying it to a greater number of producers
than one-that is, by making the rule applicable to the case of several firms as well as
to the single firm.
34. See WATKIrs, INDUSTRIAL COMBINAnoNS AND PUBLIC POLICY 105 (1927).
35. See Section V of this article for other reasons for "too much" competition.
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materials are bought, or a better method of utilizing by-products,
would not of itself be of greater advantage to a large than to a
small establishment." 36
Nor, according to Professor Watkins, do high overhead costs neces-
sarily lead to monopoly: "A high ratio of fixed capital costs to total
cost would not provoke producers to ruinous price-cutting [and the
elimination of all but the strongest] unless they expected that in the
long run their profits would be increased by marketing a larger output
at lower unit cost." 3T
Because many of the economies which make for lower costs are
available to large and small firms alike, because most examples which
are given as evidence of savings arising from large scale relate to tech-
nical engineering developments within plants, and because bargaining
advantages (as contrasted to social cost savings) are often associated
with large multi-plant firms, it has been suggested that a rather good
guide to economies of scale is provided by the size of existing plants.
The large plant, as contrasted to the large firm, is more likely to rep-
resent social, as opposed to private, advantage of size; and large firms
typically claim external economies as economies of their scale. Two
commonly alleged advantages of multi-plant operation represent pos-
sible cases of this sort-economies of selling and economies of large
scale research.
It would be misleading, however, to limit the problem of efficiency
to questions of technological adjustment within a plant. Efficiency
consists of achieving a given result with the use of a minimum amount
of resources. S. R. Dennison gives an interesting example:
"Presumably a cement works situated on the top of a moun-
tain, to which coal and raw material had to be transported from
one end of the country, and then the product carried to the other
end, could be supremely efficient-even though far more resources
(including transportation) had to be used to produce cement than
were required for a more favorably-situated works. To consider
only some of the more obvious factors affecting efficiency, and not
the whole, is a common error likely to lead to serious mistakes of
policy; it is, for instance, the basis of much over-estimation of the
gains to be derived from the re-equipment of industry." 38
Professor Stigler says that the comparative costs of private firms
can be measured in only one way: by ascertaining whether firms of
the various sizes are able to survive in the industry:
36. WATmxs, op. cit. smpra note 34, at 118 n.3.
37. Ibid.
38. Dennison, The Problem of Bigness, 1 CANMnRDGE JOURNAL 109, 112 (1947).
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"Survival is the only test of a firm's ability to cope with all
the problems: buying inputs, soothing laborers, finding customers,
introducing new products and techniques, coping with fluctua-
tions, evading regulations, etc. A cross-sectional study of the
costs of inputs per unit of output in a given period measures only
one facet of the firm's efficiency and yields no conclusion on effi-
ciency in the large. Conversely, if a firm of a given size sur-
vives, we may infer that its costs are equal to those of other sizes
of firm, being neither less (or firms of this size would grow in
number relative to the industry) nor more (or firms of this size
would decline in number relative to the industry)." 3'
Survival as an indicator of equal cost has been criticized as not
being conclusive. Professor Bain believes survival of small firms to
be equally consistent with alternative assumptions:
the survival of some small firms in a group which the
census calls an industry is not conclusive evidence that there are
negligible advantages to large scale and that there are no signifi-
cant artificial barriers to entry. Some small firms with significant
disadvantages of small scale may survive on the starvation margin,
while entry remains unattractive; geographical or other market
imperfections may make it possible for small firms to succeed in
supplying limited corners of the market while mass markets could
be successfully supplied only by large-scale producers; the small
firms in a census industry may be producing different products
than the major firms." o
Bain's criticism points to the dangers of misapplication of a sur-
vival test for efficiency. Insofar as census definitions are to be relied
upon, the warning is well justified. But census definitions may be
departed from and special aspects of markets need not be ignored.
However, equal danger of error is probably presented by recent ten-
dencies to view minor product differentiation or spatial differentiation
as evidence of unique industries.
The criticism that small firms with disadvantages of scale may
survive on the starvation margin, while entry remains unattractive,
seems to imply the existence of an economic umbrella held by the
larger, more efficient firms over the small inefficient firms. At the same
time other devices are assumed to keep similar small and inefficient
firms from entering the industry. If this be the case, it would seem that
optimum conditions are provided for the expansion of the existing
small inefficient firms. In fact, the large (efficient) firms have adopted
39. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Ami EcoN. REv. Supp.
23, 26 (1950).
40. 40 AM. Ecow. REv. Surp. 64, 65 (1950).
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a policy (through the exercise of their monopoly power) which in
effect creates a subsidy for existing small (inefficient) firms to expand
output, to increase scale of operations and to overcome the assumed
disadvantages. That in the long run they do not do so (excluding
the possibility that they are in a different part of the "industry" or
serve another market) seems to create at least a strong presumption
for the merits of a survival test.41
The dangers of adopting more rigorous standards of competition
under the Sherman Act (either by court interpretation or legislation)
for fear of causing results not consistent with maximum productive
efficiency probably have been greatly over-stressed. This stress sug-
gests that it is unlikely that there are many cases in which the presump-
tion of monopoly power can be effectively rebutted by establishing
economies of scale. This is a disputable point. It is not crucial to
an argument calling for a new presumptive standard. It is not sug-
gested that opportunity to establish real economies of scale should be
foreclosed. It is not necessary to adopt a rigid arbitrary monopoly
rule which allows no exception. A presumption of illegality (limited
to civil actions and containing no criminal penalties) for firms pro-
ducing, for example, more than 10 or 15 per cent of a product for
a given market,42 instead of the 64 to 90 per cent required by the
Alcoa case, would seem to be consistent with the analogy by which
Judge Hand reached the conclusion in the Alcoa case; it would be
consistent with the competitive purposes of the Sherman Act which
he has outlined; and it would eliminate what has been described as a
major gap in antitrust law-applicability to non-conspiring oligopo-
lies.43
An additional qualification of the presumption of illegal monopoly
power might exclude single plant firms. It would be required that
a firm not only have more than 10 or 15 per cent of the market but
also have more than one plant supplying the market.4 The burden of
41. Reference to long run in this connection, of course, relates to no definite
period of time. Long run will differ among industries. A survival test, conse-
quently, may require evidence of long-continued operation in some industries. Exist-
ing productive units of any given size may continue in use for long periods even
though they will not be replaced.
42. The burden of establishing the relevant "product" and "market" need be no
different than under current standards.
43. This is not to imply that current doctrines of conspiracy might not make
many existing oligopolies illegal under existing law. Collusion or conspiracy may
be established by indirect means. But the standards of proof and the evidentiary
problems make for great uncertainty and high costs of litigation for both plaintiff
and defendant.
44. An alternative standard, giving application to the "survival" test, might re-
quire divestiture of firms having more production than is called for by the presumptive
standard (10 or 15 per cent) if the market supports and has supported firms with
substantially smaller participation than the standard requires. A possible difficulty
1953]
590 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
establishing economies of multi-plant firms having more than 10 to 15
per cent of a market would rest upon those firms.
4 5
The proposed rule would not, of course, achieve perfect competi-
tion; but as Henry Simons has said: "[n]o sane advocate is asking
for perfect competition, and no critic who is at once fair and compe-
tent will picture the policy [monopoly policy] as requiring drastic
change in the organization of production. The requisite changes have
to do mainly with ownership units and control devices not with
operation." 11
III. SOME ASPECTS OF EFFICIENCY AND SIZE IN THE STEEL
INDUSTRY
A steel industry is basic in an industrial economy. It is a big
industry with large companies. The largest of these, United States
Steel Corporation, is the third largest industrial corporation in the
United States: it has assets in excess of two billion dollars, employs
approximately 300,000 persons, and had sales in 1949 of almost two
and one-half billion dollars. At the beginning of 1950, the U. S. Steel
Corporation subsidiaries had capacity for the production of 32 million
tons of steel per year of a total productive capacity of 99.4 million tons
for the whole country. The next largest company, Bethlehem Steel,
had capacity for producing 15 million tons, and the third largest,
Republic Steel Corporation, had 8.7 million tons of steel making ca-
pacity. No other single concern had as much as 5 million tons or 5
per cent of the productive capacity for producing steel.47
Most of the large steel-making companies are integrated concerns
whose operations extend from mining and transporting raw materials
(principally iron ore, coal and limestone), through manufacturing of
coke and coke oven by-products, pig iron, raw steel, to producing a
range of finished rolled steel products. In addition the activities of
many of the larger steel producers extend to fabrication of numerous
here arises because of the danger of inhibiting possible future technological improve-
ments leading to economies of scale within plants. This argument may, of course, be
met by pointing to the fact that in such a case the presumption of illegality would be
easily rebutted. On the other hand, it might be questionable public policy to hail
into court a single plant firm which (through no more than an attempt to compete
most effectively) had increased its market participation from, for example, 8 to 12 per
cent-even when substantially smaller firms continued to exist.
45. This would allow, and indeed make necessary, the submission of evidence
by those who are in the best position to obtain it--evidence which is much more
likely to be understood and properly evaluated than is the kind of evidence required
to show the existence of illegal monopoly power under existing standards.
46. S MONs, EcoNoMIc POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 82 (1948).
47. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monopoly Power of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. Serial
No. 14, Part 4A, Steel 501 (1950). (Capacity is in net tons of ingots.)
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products made from steel. The range of products differs among steel
producers, some specializing in certain product categories. The U. S.
Steel Corporation is represented in practically all branches of the iron
and steel business except for certain specialty items.
In studying possible monopoly power in the steel industry, the
recent monopoly subcommittee of the House of Representatives 48
focused upon the U. S. Steel Corporation in particular. Records con-
cerning U. S. Steel's operations and policies are also available from
numerous past investigations, including prior Congressional inquiries,
governmental studies, antitrust cases, and from private sources which
have made available useful data on the steel industry. In no small
measure has the U. S. Steel Corporation itself aided in making in-
formation concerning its operations generally available.
The steel industry is an industry in which concentration, as
measured by per cent of capacity or production, or by assets, or by
sales of one, two, three or four major producers, is lower than in a
number of other mass production industries. Furthermore, the posi-
tion of U. S. Steel, the major producer, has been one of relative decline
over a long period of time. For example, when U. S. Steel was formed
in 1901 it represented approximately 66 per cent of all steel produc-
tion. In 1950 its proportion of production was approximately 33
per cent.49 While the industry grew from 24 to 99 million tons ca-
pacity from 1901 to 1950, U. S. Steel grew from 102 to 32 million
tons. The large over-all expansion in the steel industry over the past
fifty years has come about from expansion of existing plants and from
new plant developments in new areas. But the multiplicity of plants
of the largest steel companies is to be accounted for in a large degree
by the merging or acquisition of formerly competing companies. Most
of the principal operating plants of U. S. Steel, or Bethlehem or Re-
public, can be traced back to prior individual ownership. The large
Gary Works of U. S. Steel is a notable exception.
This industry is widely integrated both vertically and horizontally.
It is a many-stage, multi-product industry. Typically, a large steel
producing plant includes facilities for making coke, coke-oven by-
products, pig-iron, steel ingots and a fairly wide variety of steel prod-
ucts. The largest steel companies also encompass ore operations, rail
bnd water transportation and often engage in the further fabrication
of rolled steel products. U. S. Steel is involved in all of these ac-
tivities in a number of areas.
48. Hearings, supra note 47.
49. See Appendix 1.
1953]
592 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
U. S. Steel in 1950 had six principal subsidiaries specializing in
making rolled steel products: Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation,
American Steel and Wire Company, National Tube Company, Ten-
nessee Coal, Iron and Railroad Company, Columbia Steel Company,
and Geneva Steel Company. Carnegie-Illinois is the largest of these
with principal plants in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois."0
According to the Directory of Iron and Steel Works (American Iron
and Steel Institute) for 1948, Carnegie-Illinois had capacity for the
production of 21,692,000 net tons of steel ingots. This steel capacity
was divided among nine separate steel plants.
The five other U. S. Steel subsidiaries could produce 9y million
tons of steel in 1948. (This figure represents the total of the capacities
of 10 separate plants.) The total capacity of all U. S. Steel sub-
sidiaries in 1948-31.2 million tons-was distributed among 19 plants
in 9 states. By January, 1950, total capacity of the Corporation was
increased to 32.0 million tons, and by October, 1951, to 33.9 million
tons.51
In 1950 there were 14 integrated steel companies in the United
States in addition to U. S. Steel having capacity for the production of
steel in excess of one million tons a year."2 The total capacity of
the country at this time was 99.4 million tons. Except for the three
largest producers-U. S. Steel, Bethlehem and Republic-no single
concern had as much as 5 per cent of the nation's steel-producing ca-
pacity. U. S. Steel Corporation had three plants, any one of which
had more capacity than the Inland Steel Company, the country's eighth
largest steel producer. U. S. Steel had 11 plants, each of which could
produce more steel than either Crucible Steel Company of America
or the Pittsburgh Steel Company, both among the 15 steel companies
in the United States having more than 1 million tons of steel-making
capacity.
The much larger number of separate producing plants, most of
which were formerly separately-owned producing companies, as con-
trasted to the number of firms in the steel industry (particularly the
United States Steel Corporation, Bethlehem Steel Company and the
Republic Steel Corporation), has given rise to the question of the com-
patibility of such an arrangement with the maximum amount of ef-
fective competition in an efficient steel industry.
50. It was announced by the U.S. Steel Corporation in the latter part of
1951 that these operating subsidiaries were to be made divisions of a single operating
company.
51. Hearings, supra note 47, at 501; and BusiNEss WEK 102 (Oct. 13, 1951).
52. Hearings Ibid.
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Efficiency and Size
The steel-making process in the typical large steel plant involves
first the assembling and storage of the three basic raw materials-
iron ore, coal and limestone. After the coal is converted into coke "
the next step is the production of pig iron. This intermediary product
(in the steel-making process) is produced in blast furnaces which are
charged with ore, limestone, coke and air. In 1948 there were a total
of 78 plants in the United States with capacity for the production of
pig iron. These plants contained 223 separate blast furnaces, the
combined capacity of which was 66.3 million tons of pig iron. The
three largest steel-producing (also the largest pig iron-producing)
companies had 126 of these furnaces in 31 separate plants and had
capacity for producing 61 per cent of the nation's pig iron. Eleven
independent pig iron producers without steel-making facilities had a
total of 21 furnaces capable of producing slightly less than 4.3 million
tons. The blast furnace capacity as distributed by company and by
plant among all pig iron producers, among the largest steel-producing
companies and among independent pig iron producers is depicted in
the following table:
Pig Iron Capacity in the United States, 1948
Annual Number
capacity Number of Capacity Capacity
(1000 of plants Furnaces per per
net blast with per furnace plant
Company tons) furnaces capacity plant (1000 n.t.) (1000 n.t.)
All Producers 66,342 223 78 2.86 297 851
U. S. Steel 24,520 76 16 4.75 323 1,534
Bethlehem 9,690 29 5 5.80 334 1,938
Republic 6,327 21 10 2.10 301 633
Independent
pig iron pro-
ducers "(11)* 4,265 22 14 1.57 194 305
• Companies without steel producing facilities.
Compiled from Iron and Steel Works Directory of the
United States and Canada, 1948
The foregoing table indicates that although there is variation in
the size of blast furnaces (smaller furnaces being operated by independ-
ent pig iron producers), principally the differences in the size of pig
53. Coke is typically made in by-product coke ovens in connection with blast
furnaces and steel works.
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iron-producing plants is to be accounted for by the number of fur-
naces. Large and small firms produce pig iron with similar facilities.
In 1948 the largest pig iron-producing plant in the United States was
U. S. Steel's Gary works. It had twelve furnaces capable of pro-
ducing 4.4 million tons per year-more than the combined capacity
of the eleven independent pig iron producers. On the other hand,
U. S. Steel operated a plant in Ironton, Utah which had only one
furnace capable of producing less than 200,000 net tons.
Over the last 50 years there has been a very substantial increase
in the average size of blast furnaces. For example, the 1904 Iron and
Steel Works Directory lists a total of 428 blast furnaces capable of
producing 31.5 million net tons of pig iron. Thus, from 1904 to
1948, when there were 223 furnaces capable of producing 66.3 million
tons, average furnace size increased from approximately 74,000 net
tons to 297,000 net tons per year. In spite of this substantial increase,
however, the fact that the large steel-producing plant typically contains
a large number of blast furnaces forecloses a conclusion that economical
blast furnace size accounts for the scale of operations in the largest steel
plants.
Changes in coke-making operations in steel-making plants presents
a parallel case. Significant technological advancement involving the
introduction and expansion of the modern by-product process, supplant-
ing the older beehive method, has made for better coke from poorer
coal, greater yields, recovery of valuable by-products and greater out-
put per oven. But here again, the large coke-making plant differs from
the small plant primarily in terms of the number of ovens operated. A
small pig iron producer with a single blast furnace is not foreclosed
from operating a by-product coking operation in conjunction with the
production of pig iron because of large economies of scale in the pro-
duction of coke. More coke (as contrasted to coal) was shipped to
iron producers when the older beehive process predominated as the
method for producing coke.
The next step in the steel-making process in the large steel plant,
after the pig iron production stage, is the making of the steel itself
in furnaces which are charged either with pig iron or with steel
scrap or both. This stage of the operation takes place principally in
three types of furnaces--open hearth, bessemer or electric furnaces.
Quantitatively the open hearth furnace is by far the most important.
Of a total capacity for the production of steel ingots in 1948 of 94.2
million net tons, 83.6 million tons was open hearth capacity distributed
among 954 furnaces in 95 separate plants-an average of something
less than 88,000 tons per year per furnace, but an average of nearly
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880,000 tons per plant. The average number of open hearth furnaces
in the plants in the United States having such furnaces in 1948 was
10, although many large steel plants had many more. The U. S. Steel
plant at Munhall, Pennsylvania, contained 61 open hearth furnaces and
the Gary works of the same company contained 55. On the other
hand, the average number of furnaces for the smaller semi-integrated
concerns-concerns without pig iron-producing facilities-averaged 4.5
furnaces per plant. The following table indicates the relationship be-
tween furnace size and plant size among the largest producing com-
panies and among the semi-integrated companies as compared to the
industry average:
Open Hearth Ingot Capacity in the United States, 1948
Number Capacity Capacity
Number of plants Furnaces per per
Capacity of with per furnace plant
Company (1000 n.t.) furnaces capacity plant (1000 n. t.) (1000 n. t.)
All producers 83,611 954 95 10.04 87.6 880
U. S. Steel 28,663 311 19 16.36 92.2 1,509
Bethlehem * 12,974 135 8 16.87 96.1 1,622
Republic 7,140 78 8 9.75 91.5 893
Companies
without
pig iron
capacity (30) 6,479 141 31 4.55 46.0 209
* Includes Bethlehem Pacific Corp.
Compiled from Iron and Steel Works Directory of the
United States and Canada, 1948
The older method of making steel, the bessemer process, has
largely been replaced by the open hearth process. In 1904, for ex-
ample, 15.2 million net tons of bessemer steel could be produced in
the United States. At that time there were 105 bessemer converters.
By 1948 there were only 39 converters, ten of which were used only
for melting the charge for open hearth furnaces. Total bessemer ca-
pacity had declined to only slightly over 5 million net tons. On the
other hand the number of open hearth furnaces was increased from 577
in 1904 to 954 in 1948 "' and production increased from 12.7 million
net tons to 83.6 million net tons. Although a very large increase in the
54. IRoN AND STEEL WORKS DnIcroa (1904); and DIRECTORY OF IRON AND
STEr WoRxs OF UNITED STATES AND CArADA 463 (1948).
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average size of open hearth furnaces is apparent from these figures, it
is more significant for purposes of analyzing economies of scale in rela-
tion to the market that in 1948 more than 950 open hearth furnaces in
95 plants were used in the production of steel.
Prior to the advent of the open hearth furnace, steel had to be
made exclusively from pig iron, for the bessemer converter or the
crucible process can not utilize scrap steel. Today about as much
scrap as pig iron is used in the steel-making process. The ability
to use scrap, along with the facts that lower grade (high phosphorous)
ores can be used and that quality can be more carefully controlled in
open hearth furnaces, accounts in a large part for the displacement of
the bessemer process. In addition to these technological reasons the
ability to use scrap significantly reduced a possible barrier to entry
into the steel business arising from close control of the principal steel-
making ingredients.
A third method of making steel, and one of rising importance, is
the electric furnace. The electric furnace process allows close control
over operations and is especially important in the production of special
and high grade steels in relatively small quantities. More recently, how-
ever, its use has been expanded to more general purpose steel. De-
pending largely or wholly on scrap as a raw material, the electric fur-
nace has made steel-making feasible on a relatively small scale in areas
which formerly could not support an economical steel-making opera-
tion. The relative plant and furnace size in electric furnace operation
is shown in the following table:
Electric Furnace Steel Ingot Capacity in the United States
1948
Capacity
Number per
Number of plants Furnaces Capacity plant
Capacity of fur- with fur- per per furnace (1000
Company (1000 n. t.) naces naces plant (1000 n. t) n. t.)
All Electric
furnace
producers 5,397 222 62 3.6 24.6 87.0
U. S. Steel 434 15 5 3.0 28.9 86.8
Bethlehem * 254 10 2 5.0 25.4 126.0
Republic 760 16 2 8.0 47.5 380.0
All other (41) 3,949 181 53 3.4 21.8 74.5
* Includes Bethlehem Pacific Corp.
Compiled from Iron and Steel Works Directory of the
United States and Canada, 1948
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Although there have been technological developments in the steel-
making process which, as has been indicated, have made for the use
of larger units for the production of both pig iron and raw steel, by
far the most significant technological advance has been in rolling proc-
esses, especially continuous rolling of light flat products such as sheets
and strip.
Before the advent of the continuous rolling mill such products
as sheets and tin plate, for example, were typically manufactured in
small plants with the utilization of a great deal of direct labor. Al-
though it requires very large capital investment, the continuous mill
has reduced the cost of making sheet steel very markedly. As Mr.
Ramseyer, a consulting engineer, testified: ". . . the cost above ma-
terials on a big continuous strip mill would be not more than one-fourth
as much as the cost above materials in converting semifinished steel
into sheets in the old-fashioned hot-steel mill." ", The development
of the continuous mill has had the effect of concentrating production
in fewer plants than was formerly required.
The products of steel rolling mills include a wide variety of prod-
ucts of varying size and chemical composition. Heavy products such
as rails and structural shapes must be rolled on facilities designed for
the production of each of these particular products. Bars and wire
rods are also rolled on facilities designed for their production. The
rolling of light flat products such as sheets, strip and tin plate also
require special equipment, and here especially changes in production
techniques have made necessary much larger plants.
From 1904 to 1948 the number of rolling mills in the United
States declined from 475 to 177.56 Average annual production of all
finished rolled products 1901-05 was 15.3 million tons. By 1948 pro-
duction of finished rolled products had increased to 69.2 million tons.5"
Over this same period there was a marked change in the composition
of products produced. Particularly this is evidenced by a tremendous
growth, both actually and relatively, in the consumption of flat rolled
products. Production of plates and sheets, for example, increased from
3.0 million to 25.7 million tons. On the other hand, rail production,
which made up nearly one-third of rolled steel production in the earlier
period, actually declined from 3.2 to 2.2 million tons.
There are wide divergences in the size of steel rolling mills de-
pending primarily on the type of products produced. There are also
55. Hearings, supra note 47, at 414.
56. DnmXCTORios, op. cit. supra note 54, at xv (1904) ; at 473-75 (1948).
57. STATISTICAm A STRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 799 (1951).
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significant differences in the plant capacity for the production of sim-
ilar products in different plants.
For example, there were 9 plants in the United States capable
of producing heavy rails in 1948. Average capacity was 300.5 thou-
sand tons. The largest could produce 621.3 thousand tons. One plant
had capacity for producing only 19 thousand tons. The comparable
figures for other important selected steel products in 1948 were as
follows:
Average Largest Smallest
plant plant plant
Number capacity capacity capacity
Of (000 (000 (000
Product plants omitted) omitted) omitted) 1
Heavy shapes 23 227.7 1,275.0 * 5.0 *
Sheared plates 29 200.4 700.0 * 0.4 *
Hot rolled sheets 48 394.7 1,170.0 * 1.1 *
Strip for cold reduced
black plate and tin
plate 10 411.4 890.0 120.0
Bars (other than con-
crete reinforcing) 96 125.1 675.0 ** 1.8 **
Wire Rods 36 172.1 440.0 ** 2.5 **
* Excludes Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corp.
** Excludes U. S. Steel plants.
1 Especially in flat rolled products, smallest plants probably pro-
duce specialty products.
Compiled from the Iron and Steel Works Directory of the
United States and Canada, 1948
Large scale operations have become important in the production
of numerous steel products. The foregoing table indicates a very wide
range of plant size in each of a number of products, however. Were
each product class made up of homogeneous products it is doubtful
if the very small plants (the smallest plants in the foregoing table)
would be included. Consequently, minimum plant size examples are
not necessarily indicative of scale economies. It is notable that the
largest plants designed for the continuous rolling of light flat products
exceed a million tons of product per year. But it is also notable that
continuous rolling is successfully achieved with very much lower capac-
ity facilities. In fact the average mill for the production of tin mill
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strip, a fairly homogeneous category, all of which is produced by mod-
ern methods, is slightly more than 400,000 net tons per year. Scale
economies are greatest here. On the other hand, both bars and wire
rods, products of the same general type, have long been made in small
and medium size plants.
The Republic Steel Corporation, one of the major concerns in the
bar business, with capacity for the production of more than three million
tons of bars per year, has 9 plants which produce bars. The largest
of these, its Buffalo plant, with an annual capacity of 675,000 tons, in
addition to a 38 inch blooming mill and an 18 inch billet mill (for
semi-finished stock), contains three bar mills, a 14 inch mill with a
maximum capacity of 375,000 tons, a 10 inch mill with a maximum ca-
pacity of 200,000 tons, and an 8 inch mill with a capacity of 100,000
tons. Each of these is separately operated. There is, however, only
one blooming mill, a 38 inch mill with a 600,000 ton capacity which
provides the material which is fed into the three bar mills. Blooming
mill operation is a principal limiting factor upon small scale operations
in rolling mill plants. Republic Steel Corporation, for example, has
10 blooming mills in 8 different plants, the smallest of which has a
capacity for the production of 500,000 tons per year and the largest
of which is capable of producing 1,200,000 tons. Thus, the three bar
mills at Republic's Buffalo plant provide balance for the capacity of
the blooming mill there. On the other hand, blooming capacity, or
its equivalent, is essential for the production of all finished steel. Were
other products than bars produced at Buffalo, three bar mills would
not seem to be required. So, for example, at Republic's Gadsden,
Alabama, plant where one blooming mill with 600,000 tons capacity
is operated, only 150,000 tons of bars are produced, and sheets, skelp
and wire rods are also made, none of which can be produced in
quantities in excess of 185,000 tons per year. Moreover, although
there are savings in costs from producing some finished products from
semi-finished material that has not cooled, integrated finishing opera-
tion is much more typical in the production of light flat rolled products
than it is for other products, including bars. Consequently there is a
significant amount of bar rolling carried on in plants which procure
their semi-finished materials from outside plants. Republic's bar
plant at Moline, Illinois with a total capacity of 90,000 tons per year
provides this kind of example.
Although there are plants with large capacities for the production
of light flat rolled products, plates, shapes and rails, still plants with sub-
stantially smaller capacities also exist in all of the product categories.
The Inland Steel Company operating principally one large plant has
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capacity for the production of a number of products in relatively small
amounts. Except for sheets, for which Inland had capacity of one mil-
lion tons (500,000 cold rolled), none of the 22 products for which the
Iron and Steel Works Directory for 1948 listed capacity could be pro-
duced in amounts in excess of 250,000 tons.
Multi-Plant Operation
In addition to variations in the size of operations carried on in
particular plants, the problem of scale economies involves questions
concerning multi-plant operation. Each of the three largest steel
producers, but especially U. S. Steel, has a great many separate plants.
Are advantages present from having a large number of plants under
one central management? Are these advantages of scale and not ad-
vantages which arise from the elimination of or preclusion of com-
petition among the plants (monopoly advantage) ? Of the economies
of large multi-plant steel companies, among the more important that
have been suggested are savings in administrative and selling costs
in serving extensive markets, product specialization in particular plants
making for operating economies, economies in raw material assembly
and transportation, interplant competition and rivalry for better operat-
ing practice, adequate size to carry on essential research, and provision
for an ample source of funds required for developing raw material
sources and building new facilities.
a. Savings in Administrative and Selling Costs.-Advertising and
sales expenses are incurred in selling steel, but they are of much less
importance than in other industries which sell products to ultimate
consumers. Steel is typically purchased by specification and the prod-
uct of one company is readily substituted for that of another. If there
are even minor price differentials changes in source of supply can be
expected to occur. Product differentiation, such as exists, for ex-
ample, in automobiles, refrigerators, ladies dresses, or cigarettes is not
typical in steel. Relatively low selling expenses for steel have been
characteristic in the industry58 There is probably greater variation in
selling expense arising from differences in products sold than from
differences in size of company.69 There is no evidence that the smaller
steel firms appear to be at a disadvantage, even though their markets
may not be as extensive or their line of products as broad as those of
58. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF CORPORATIONS ON THE STEEL IN-
DUSTRY, PART III, 20 (1913).
59. A comparison of cost of selling and sales among steel companies yield no
observable variation by size of company.
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the largest firms. Furthermore, there are numerous successful in-
dependent selling firms in the steel industry which effectively serve
large and small firms alike. The advantage in selling costs to firms
having one or a very few plants is not readily apparent.
b. Product Specialization.-At the time the combination which
became the United States Steel Corporation was formed, one of the
contentions about the cost savings that accrued or were to accrue re-
lated to savings from specializing particular formerly competing plants
in the production of a particular product or group of products. Pro-
fessor Jenks in writing about the economies of U. S. Steel 6 quotes
an estimate that the American Steel Hoop Company, then a subsidiary
of U. S. Steel, by dividing up 85 or 90 sizes and varieties so that
each plant specialized in one group of sizes or varieties was able to
save from a dollar to a dollar and a half per ton simply by avoiding
frequent change of rolls.
Economies achieved from product specialization are not neces-
sarily to be ascribed to multi-plant companies. With respect to the par-
ticular example cited by Professor Jenks, why, if it was more economi-
cal to specialize, did not the formerly separate companies making up
the American Steel Hoop Company so specialize? In 1904, after
American Steel Hoop had been merged with National Steel Company
and the Carnegie Steel Company under the name of the Carnegie Steel
Company (of New Jersey), 10 small plants of the former Hoop Com-
pany were being operated. These were for the most part small non-
integrated plants, many with facilities obsolete even at that time. The
plants were scattered throughout western Pennsylvania and north-
eastern Ohio. Principally they made barrel hoops, cotton ties, skelp
and bars. Apart from the Upper Union Mill at Youngstown, Ohio,
which was subsequently rebuilt and expanded, all of the other plants
were later discontinued. Moreover, the discontinued capacity was sup-
planted by larger mills with facilities for producing a wider range of
products and sizes than existed in the displaced mills.
There is some specialization in the production of steel. It is not
limited to multi-plant companies. It is as common among the smaller
one plant companies. Lukens Steel in Coatesville, Pennsylvania, for
example, has long been an important supplier of wide plates. Pipe and
tube production is carried on in plants specializing in these products
both in single plant and multi-plant companies. Tubular products are
also successfully produced in large multiproduct plants. A conclusion
that product specialization is causally related to multi-plant operation
is not justified.
60. JENiKs, THE TRUST PROBLEm 37 (1911).
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c. Economies of Integration into Raw Material Supply and Trans-
portation.-Many, if not most, of the large steel firms own ore and
coal properties and transportation facilities. These operations have
come to be considered necessary adjuncts to steel production. Dif-
ferent explanations have been given for this development. Some have
explained this phenomenon in terms of efficiency. A letter from Mr.
Henry Oliver to Mr. H. C. Frick prior to the formation of the United
States Steel Corporation stated (July 27, 1897) :
"I claim that we could produce and deliver our ore to Lake Erie
ports 20 to 30 cents per ton cheaper than it could be done by
those now in control of the mines we seek. Our saving would
be in steady and more regular mining, in avoiding a line of high
salaried officers, in procuring lower freight rates, and in saving
the Cleveland commission of 10 cents per ton." 61
It is clear that all of the advantages Mr. Oliver expected to achieve
did not arise from conditions which might be characterized as "effi-
ciency." The absence of competition in the ore trades rather than the
inherent advantage of ownership by a large user undoubtedly made
for commercial advantages. The competitive condition of the ore trade
in 1898 is of interest in this connection:
"The preliminary negotiations looking to the continuance in 1898
of the organization of Bessemer ore producers are on the as-
sumption that the pool this year will include the Mesabi range.
. Appearances thus far are that Mesabi producers will wel-
come an agreement." 02
Integration by steel-making concerns into ore-mining operations
has long had its "protective" aspects, which still remain. Mr. White,
Republic Steel Corporation president, said in April 1950:
"Steel, being the only market for iron ore, an iron-ore company,
whose basic capital asset is iron ore in place in the ground, would
be foolish not to seek some long-term arrangement with steel
producers to make its future market safe. Conversely, iron ore,
being a basic ingredient in steel, a steel producer, whose primary
source of income on investment is the sale of steel and steel prod-
ucts, would be equally foolish not to seek some long-term source
of iron-ore supply." '
Judge Gary, testifying for the United States Steel Corporation
before the Stanley Committee in 1911, gave a different kind of ex-
61. Hearings before the Committee on Investigation of United States Steel Cor-
poration, H.R. 2597 (1910-1912).
62. 31 IRoN TRADE REVEw 3 (1898).
63. Hearings, supra note 47, at 222.
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planation of the advantages of a steel company's ownership of ore and
transportation facilities:
"The fact that the United States Steel Corporation is the owner
of ore and of transportation companies-I should say, the fact
that it is in control, because the ownership is in these subsidiary
companies-enables it to receive some profits by the operation of
those mines and those transportation companies, and, therefore,
from the standpoint of the United States Steel Corporation, re-
duces the cost of production; and that being so, we would have
some advantage over competitors not having such facilities, and
could afford to sell cheaper than they could afford to sell." "
A similar contention was made in the Bureau of Corporations'
Report on the Iron and Steel Industry at about the same time. The
point is not a good one, as Professor Watkins has indicated in his book,
Industrial Combination and Public Policy:
"The Report mentions as a distinct class of economies from inte-
gration the savings of 'profits' previously paid to others on ma-
terials purchased. Elsewhere the Bureau declares that the 'econ-
omies' derived from this last source were the chief advantages
gained by the combination. It grants that the savings effected
in this direction must have been considerable The argument in-
volves a kind of specious reasoning that has become familiar in
recent years in the attack on the existing distributive organization
(particularly on middlemen). Either the raw materials were sold
to the blast furnace operators at a fair competitive price prior to
the organization of the corporation or they were disposed of un-
der monopolistic conditions. If the former, it is not apparent how
the combine could have reduced the cost of its materials to its
blast furnaces without sacrificing something on the capital and
managerial ability devoted to getting out and transporting the raw
materials, unless indeed the larger scale of these operations re-
duced somewhat the insured or uninsured risks. If, on the other
hand, a monopolistic condition be assumed it is certain that the
acquisition or lease of these iron and coal mines and limestone
quarries and shipping facilities could not have been made save
upon terms that gave their prior owners the full discounted value
of the calculable returns from these properties operated as a
monopoly. Consequently the 'profits' saved from the hands of
the security holders of these mining companies became essential
for meeting the demands for income from the holders of the se-
curities of the combination. In whatever way they are regarded
these particular 'commercial economies' of integration evaporate
under analysis." 6
64. Hearings, supra note 61, at 113.
65. WATKixNS, INDUSTRIAL COMBINATION AND PUBLIC PoLIcY 118 n.3 (1927).
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The principal advantage in the ownership of ore deposits and
transportation facilities which can be related to the efficiency of opera-
tions has been said to be the regularization of the flow of raw materials.
This was one of the advantages claimed by Mr. Oliver as early as
1897. Here is an advantage which rarely is alleged when there is
effective competition in the market for the raw materials required.
Flour mills, for example, do not find it advantageous to own wheat
farms, nor do the cigarette companies grow their own tobacco. And
in both cases a regular flow of raw materials for orderly production
would seem as essential as for steel-making. Furthermore, ore is not
necessarily used as it is received in the steel industry. Storage is
usual. Ore can be shipped on the Great Lakes only during ice free
months. The advantage of closely correlating ore production and
transportation with steel-making is belied by operating practice. Ore
mining properties owned or leased by steel firms are often if not
typically separately managed by independent companies under long
term operating agreements.
Historically the expansion of steel firms into the raw material
and transportation business is principally to be explained by fear of
being "caught short" or of being exploited by others. The absence
of competition or an expected absence of competition on one level of
operation (here ore mining or lake transportation) has created the
occasion for integration from another level (steel-making).
d. Inter-Plant Rivalry.-Mr. Weir, chairman, National Steel
Corporation, believes that some advantage occurs from having more
than a single plant in a company. For example, he testified in recent
hearings that "out of the larger number of plants there does come ad-
ditional competition," and he felt that this was a significant addition
to the competition in the steel industry as a whole.66
The competition of the market place apparently does not provide
the incentive or the comparative information required for maximizing
efficiency in the steel industry, according to Mr. Weir. Mr. Weir's
company, National, comprised of two principal producing plants each
having a capacity slightly less than 22 million tons, and Inland Steel
Company, having one principal producing plant of 3.4 million tons,
are generally regarded as among the more efficient of the steel-making
concerns. The difficulties they encounter by not having extensive
inter-plant competition apparently has not been serious.
It is notable that the advantage of multi-plant operation claimed
here is hardly consistent with a previous advantage alleged to derive
66. Hearings, supra note 47, at 834.
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from product specialization by plants, unless it can be assumed that
the advantages accrued from inter-plant rivalry in non-competing prod-
ucts. But if this is the case, then why can not the same advantages
be achieved from rivalry inside a single plant? The case for inter-
plant rivalry is not too convincing. In no small measure the case
seems to amount to a method for counteracting the absence of more
effective inter-company competition.
e. Research Requirements.-One of the most widely claimed ad-
vantages of the large producing concerns over smaller producers is the
ability to carry on much needed research. For example, Dr. R. E.
Zimmerman, Vice President-Research and Technology, U. S. Steel, in
a pamphlet submitted to the Celler Committee quotes with approval
the statement on page 10 of the Fourth Annual Report to the Presi-
dent by the Council of Economic Advisers (Dec. 29, 1949): "In a
stable and expanding economy there is room both for well conducted
big business (with its unique facilities for scientific and developmental
experimentation) and for small business with its display of individual-
ism and self-reliance." 17 (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Zimmerman then goes on to point out that U. S. Steel is
equipped with these "unique facilities." A number of typical develop-
ments are then illustrated in which research plays its part in a large
basic industry. Among those listed are tin-plate, including electro-
lytic tinning; research on alloy steels and heat treatment; automotive
steel; high-strength low alloy steels; television specialties; stainless
steel; electric furnace operation (Heroult Electric Steel Making Fur-
nace) ; large seamless pipe; ore beneficiation.68
One of the "size requirements" of research is related to the high
cost of disappointments. In this connection, Dr. Zimmerman states:
"Only a few of the developments with which research and tech-
nology in United States Steel have been deeply concerned have
been mentioned as typical illustrations. A complete list would
be long, replete with accomplishments, and as is inevitable in mat-
ters of research, marked with some costly disappointments. The
latter may be illustrated by such projects as a $1,500,000 attempt
to develop an economically useful direct-reduction process for the
production of sponge iron; a long, tedious, and expensive series
of trials, in collaboration with one of the world's most famous
scientists, to secure steel with three times the usual strength by
casting the molten metal through a novel, intricate device into
a vacuum; a $300,000 experience with a new kind of electric
furnace which later proved unnecessary; the development of many
67. Id. at 678.
68. Ibid.
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types of initially promising equipment, products, and processes
which were soon superseded because of the rapid advance of tech-
nology. These debit items in the accounts of research are produc-
tive of data and experience, but of no direct financial returns. All
of which illustrates the point that in the persistent search for
advanced techniques and better products, a progressive company
must be prepared and able to absorb some very substantial and
not infrequent losses. It must be large enough and strong enough
to do so without impairment of its normal functions." "
But how large is large enough for purposes of adequate research?
National Steel Corporation, with less than 5 per cent of the nation's
steel-making capacity, as well as other smaller steel companies, have
research and development performance records which have been pointed
to as outstanding. National's tin plate facilities are located in a single
plant in West Virginia. Mr. Weir's company installed the first fully
continuous, four-high rolling mill in 1926; it pioneered in the develop-
ment of the electrolytic line, beginning with a pilot line in 1938; it
now has the largest tin plate plant in the world, 70 and is building one
of the largest oxygen plants in the United States.7 1
Apparently an extremely large multi-plant company is not re-
quired to carry on successful research in steel. According to Mr. Weir,
for example, two per cent of the total number of National Steel em-
ployees have jobs in the research and development end of the business.7"
This kind of work, he said, is carried on by all steel companies. Mr.
Weir was asked the question directly with respect to research require-
ments and the size of his company.
"Question. Do you think your firm is too small to be able
to effectively do research or to develop these new processes and
methods?
"Mr. Weir. Not at all, no, sir." 73
Perhaps Mr. Weir could hardly be expected to testify otherwise about
his own company.
Numerous witnesses, including steel company representatives, and
other experts, testified before the Celler Committee that the develop-
ment of continuous rolling techniques has been one of the most if not
the most important technological development in the past 50 years.
The American Rolling Mill Co. (now Armco Corp.), then one of the
69. Id. at 685.
70. Id. at 808, 809.
71. Ibid.
72. Id. at 809.
73. Id. at 835.
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smaller integrated companies, held the basic patents in America in
this important field, and it and National were among the first to put
them into operation. The smaller integrated companies have generally
been as fast or faster in working these new developments into their
productive processes than has U. S. Steel. At the very least they have
suffered no disadvantage on this score. As late as 1938, about a third
of the tin plate capacity was held by U. S. Steel, but it had only 25 per
cent of the cold reduced capacity. National Steel Corporation, on the
other hand, had only 5.4 per cent of the older but 20.2 per cent of the
newer capacity.74
Not only have the smaller companies been at no particular dis-
advantage with respect to technology and research, but there are in-
dications that the very large size of U. S. Steel, at least in the period
prior to 1936, actually made for lags in development. An extensive
survey by Fortune Magazine contained the following comment:
"Technology. . . . the Corporation has contributed very little to
the art of making steel. It was late getting into continuous strip
mills. It was late getting into alloys. It has not yet adopted full
combustion control on its open hearth furnaces. . . . Bethle-
hem patented the sensational Gray beam. . . . Republic is the
leader in alloy steels. American Rolling Mills developed the con-
tinuous strip process. The Cold Metal Process Co. patented the
Steckel reversing mill, most recent important advance. Inquiry
uncovers just one triumph for the Corporation: it was the first
to sense the importance of low alloys, i.e., high-tensile steel with
small percentages of costly chromium, manganese, vanadium, and
other alloy metals. . . .,, "
Criticism concerning sluggishness in getting into new activities
and discarding old methods and outmoded practice has not been con-
fined to popular surveys. A very extensive engineering study was un-
dertaken by an engineering firm in conjunction with the U. S. Steel
Corporation. Its purpose was to analyze the workings of U. S. Steel
and its policies. The engineering report for U. S. Steel was completed
in 1938. Although it stated that the corporation was "equipped rea-
sonably to meet present day competition in the steel industry in this
country and abroad from the standpoint of types, quality of products
made, facilities possessed, trained manpower in its mill(s), organiza-
tion functioning, and business procedures now in effect or shortly to
be made effective," 71 it did point out that U. S. Steel's position in
74. Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee, 76th Cong.,
2d Sess., Part 18, 10,409 (1939).
75. FORTUN, 173 (Mar. 1936).
76. Hearings, supra note 47, at 644.
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some products was lagging because of the continuous hot strip mills
of competitors. 7 The steel corporation was also advised that its rela-
tive position in steel rails was of comparatively little benefit to the cor-
poration.7 The report further pointed out that:
"the Corporation and subsidiaries lack adequate knowledge of
the markets"; " "the Corporation has followed rather than led"
in "the introduction of new products and in providing of new fa-
cilities for meeting changing market requirements"; 8 "National
Tube, with the exception of Lorain and the plant at Gary, was
not particularly good" ; 81 "the subsidiaries did not keep pace with
competitors in the development and utilization of waste gases, par-
ticularly blast furnace gases";"2 "the Corporation was slow in
getting into the production of cold rolled steel products," ' of
"stainless steel products," 84 and was also "slow in tin plate de-
velopment." 85
Much of the criticism of U. S. Steel in the thirties unquestionably
arose because of its poor profit showing during the depression years as
compared to profits of several smaller companies whose line of products
was such that depression demand did not affect them so adversely.
Also, a great deal of modernization has taken place since in U. S. Steel,
as elsewhere within the industry.
In general, all steel companies, large and small, participate in the
research and development which leads to technological change in steel
making. There is nothing to show that research and engineering work
in the steel industry is limited to one, two, or three companies.8 6 The
limitations imposed upon successful research in steel, in so far as they
are effective, do not appear to be such that companies not having far-
flung operations in many plants have lagged behind their larger com-
petitors. An opposite conclusion is not entirely unwarranted.
f. Adequacy of Funds.-A very large capital investment is re-
quired to construct, supply and operate a steel producing company.
The financial ability to undertake these operations is often pointed to
77. Id. at 588, 646.
78. Id. at 589.
79. Id. at 645.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Id. at 646.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Id. at 414. (See testimony of Mr. Ramseyer.)
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as an advantage of large size. To replace the facilities of the National
Steel Corporation, a concern with capacity for the production of ap-
proximately 5 million tons of steel per year, would require at 1950
costs, according to Mr. Weir (National's board chairman) approxi-
mately 1 billion dollars. A big continuous rolling mill for sheets
would alone cost 50 million dollars.
Experience of the Government in disposing of the Geneva steel
plant after the last war also indicates at least in part a "capital" prob-
lem. This plant, with capacity of approximately 1% million tons was
built and operated during the last war for the Government by U. S.
Steel at a cost approaching 200 million dollars. After the war it was
disposed of by bid to U. S. Steel. The amount of new equipment
and funds required to operate the plant for peace-time purposes, along
with other factors, gave rise to a situation in which the U. S. Steel
Corporation was the only bidder which bid in such a manner that
a large part of the risk of income from future operations did not have
to be assumed by the Government.
The high cost of obtaining an adequate and reliable supply of ore
has also been cited as giving rise to very large capital requirements.
Today substantial dependence upon the open market for an ore supply
would be deemed foolish according to steel company representatives.
With the depletion of the high grade ore deposits of the Lake Superior
region, the high cost of beneficiating low grade ores or developing
foreign deposits adds to already high capital requirements. For ex-
ample, proposed taconite production is said to require in excess of 20
dollars of capital investment per ton of ore production.
7 In order
to utilize the rich deposits being developed by the U. S. Steel Cor-
poration in Venezuela, the railroad alone from the ore deposit to the
coast has been estimated to cost 113 million dollars.
88
Large capital requirements unquestionably characterize the typical
steel company. The size of these requirements depends in part upon
the economies of scale at various levels of the productive process. The
degree of integration, both horizontal and vertical, which may or may
not result from economies of scale also affects the magnitude of in-
vestment required by a single concern. Commercial reasons in addi-
tion to economies of scale play an important part, as is evidenced by
early acquisition of ore properties by steel producers. An absence
of effective competition may lead to integration into new fields even
though no economy of joint operation is apparent. One point of view
87. Lippert, Cerro Bolivar-Saga of Iron Ore Crisis Averted, 188 J. MErALs
222, 225 (1950).
88. Ibid.
1953]
610 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101
is expressed by Professor M. A. Adelman in a recent article on integra-
tion:
"Reliability of an adequate supply is not usually an objective fact
or a calculable cost, but a judgment, a state of mind. In a 'thin'
and unreliable market it may pay to 'roll your own' even at a
higher cost, the additional burden being in effect an insurance
payment." 89
Relatively small steel companies have large capital requirements,
but it is not altogether clear that the costs of raising capital are such
that only the two or three of the largest steel companies can get low
costs, even though the lowest rates appear to be obtainable in so far
as the issues of securities are concerned on issues of 50 million dollars
or more. 0 Commissioner Donald C. Cook, Securities and Exchange
Commission, presented to the Celler Committee a study concerned with
financing of the steel industry.91
The S.E.C. study indicated that 14 of 16 steel companies in-
cluded represented combinations of existing businesses; none was in-
itially financed by the sale of equity securities.92  Before World War
I (the formative period of these companies) public issues were rela-
tively small and were offered "by more or less local underwriting
firms." '- Commencing around 1935 most of the steel companies went
through extensive refunding operations (Kuhn, Loeb and Co. played
a prominent role for Bethlehem, Republic, National, Youngstown, and
Wheeling)." More recently, the companies have been retiring their
publicly held debt, most financing being accomplished through private
placements or bank loans.95
Commissioner Cook reported that it is the small businesses that
have serious problems of raising equity capital: "The largest cost by
far in connection with financing a small company is the underwriting
costs. . . . A large business, on the other hand, has many avenues
through which it can finance." 96 Mr. Cook testified that financing a
modern steel company at a cost of 200 or 250 million dollars would be
89. Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 291 (1949).
90. Id. at 33. "From 1945 to 1947, according to the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the cost of flotation was 22 per cent of the gross proceeds for issues
under half a million dollars, and declined steadily with increasing size, falling to
only 1.15 per cent for issues of fifty million or over."
91. Mr. Cook's testimony begins in Hearings, supra note 47, at 420.
92. Id. at 423.
93. Id. at 426.
94. Ibid. It may be noted that the Wheeling Steel Corp., with less than 2
million tons capacity, is included among the "large" companies.
95. Ibid.
96. Id. at 433.
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a difficult undertaking even if ore and other raw material supplies could
be assured,9 7 and that existing steel companies have been built by com-
bination of smaller units. 8
Large scale production has afforded an opportunity for making
more effective use of facilities and other resources in many industries,
including the steel industry. Economies of scale, however, are often
misinterpreted. Plants must be distinguished from companies. And
even within plants the "up to a point proviso" is very important even
if often overlooked. Decreasing costs do not continue infinitely with
increases in size. Historically, there is little basis for explaining the
size of the largest steel-making firms in the United States on the
basis of efficiency. A very substantial increase in the number of com-
peting companies could very probably be effected if the changes were
limited entirely to the composition of ownership units .and control de-
vices without the slightest change in the actual patterns of production.
Such a change in the control structure of the steel industry could not
help but make for more competition.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF MONOPOLY BY PERFORMANCE
The Sherman Act makes possible the application of several dif-
ferent kinds of tests to determine illegality under section 2. These
may be described broadly as power, behavior and intent. Power, as
has been indicated, has become relevant by broadening the coverage
of illegal behavior to include any selling activity by one who has
enough economic power to set a market price by the mere act of
selling. Thus, strictly speaking, power alone is not enough, but as
Judge Hand has pointed out, the distinction is a purely formal one,
at least when 90 per cent of the market is involved.9
A specific purpose or intention to create a monopoly has long
been held to be illegal under the Sherman Act. Drawing a neat and
logical distinction between "normal business practices" and an intention
to create a monopoly has not been an easy task for courts. In the
absence of documentary proof of a specific purpose or intent, the kind
of behavior from which this intent may most clearly be inferred usually
has involved actions which themselves would constitute illegal behavior
under section 1. Thus, in the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey
case 100 in 1911, although a prima facie case of intent was said to be
established by the fact that so many corporations with so vast a capital
97. Id. at 434.
98. Ibid.
99. Unless, of course, monopoly is "thrust upon" the monopolist.
100. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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were brought together, this presumption was found to be conclusive
(i.e., outweighing possible countervailing circumstances) in view of
the conduct of the defendant-railroad rebates, division of territories,
secret arrangements, etc.
Judge Hand, in deciding the Alcoa case, had the following to
say about intent:
"Although the primary evil was monopoly, the Act also covered
preliminary steps, which, if continued, would lead to it. These
may do no harm of themselves; but if they are initial moves in
a plan or scheme which, carried out, will result in monopoly, they
are dangerous and the law will nip them in the bud. For this
reason conduct falling short of monopoly, is not illegal unless
it is part of a plan to monopolize, or to gain such other control
of a market as is equally forbidden. To make it so, the plaintiff
must prove what in the criminal law is known as 'specific intent';
an intent which goes beyond the mere intent to do the act."
This is the kind of intent that the Government tried so hard and so un-
successfully to indicate to the lower court in the Alcoa case. Judge
Hand disregarded this specific intent. The lower court found such
proof necessary for a violation of section 2. Judge Hand, in reversing
the lower court, found it unnecessary.
It has been suggested that the law should move from a concept
of specific intent, as has been outlined, to one of more general intent as
a means of determining illegality under the Sherman Act. In terms
of economic analysis the suggestion is unpromising. The very basis
of economic motivation is the proposition that individuals and busi-
ness firms intend to maximize gains and minimize losses. Much of
what passes for good salesmanship in the business community is prob-
ably an attempt to achieve at least some semblance of a monopoly posi-
tion. Examples would include such activity as making a product so
distinctive that close substitutes will not be available, attempting to
get a long-term requirements contract, or disparaging a competitive
product even by suggestion. Such instances are not likely to involve
serious departure from competitive results, but not because business-
men would not like to achieve partial monopoly or do not intend to do
so. Monopoly is of economic concern because of its results or its prob-
able results. The essential precondition of monopoly is, as Judge
Learned Hand has said, the power of a firm to significantly affect
price by varying its output.
In the Alcoa case Judge Hand found it possible to dispense with
intent as a requirement of illegality under section 2, in the case of a
firm representing 90 per cent of the production in the market. In
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the cases he cites for the establishment of such a result are instances
in which monopoly power is recognized with much lower percentages
of market control. Although the power to affect price is not precisely
identifiable with any specific percentage of control, both in terms of
past cases and in terms of actual market experience, a 10 to 15 per
cent rule seems preferable to the 64 to 90 per cent rule which he sug-
gests. Only a rebuttable presumption of illegality is suggested in
either rule. The requirement of a showing of specific intent would be
dispensed with only in civil cases and for multiplant firms supplying
10 to 15 per cent of market requirements. The rationale of the pro-
posed rule is exactly that which was given by Judge Hand in establish-
ing the so-called rule of the Alcoa case.
Concentration Measures
In attempts to describe the monopoly problem in a particular
field much attention recently has been focused upon the number and
concentration of sellers. Market structures, of course, are infinitely
varied. They may be distinguished in a number of ways. In the
context of the monopoly problem, the number of sellers and the num-
ber of buyers is relevant to the kind of independent action to be ex-
pected from each as well as to the possibilities of collusive action among
them. A principal requirement of a competitive market is that there
be enough sellers (or buyers) of a product or service so that each seller
(or buyer) will arrange his own activities without regard for the offers
of his rivals. With fewer and fewer sellers (or buyers) this result
becomes less and less likely. The ability of single sellers or buyers
(or combinations of either) to affect price or control output depends
upon getting a sufficient concentration of control over the product
demanded to make the exercise of this power possible.
The ability to affect price (monopoly power) will, of course be
different depending upon the availability of close substitutes for the
product offered in cases where a product is offered only by a few sellers.
In the Alcoa case, for example, there was the question of what con-
stituted the industry. Should the relevant product category include
only virgin aluminum or should scrap aluminum also be included?
What was the relevance of competition from other light metals such
as magnesium or stainless steel? Such factors are economically rele-
vant. At least they set the limits of Alcoa's monopoly power. To
recognize the existence of such factors, however, does not negate the
proposition that an increase in the number of sellers or buyers is al-
ways consistent with a more competitive result and not consistent with
a less competitive result.
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Indices of monopoly power which result from a "counting" tech-
nique, an index of monopoly which is roughly the inverse of the num-
ber of sellers, 1 ' have been subjected to criticism principally because
of the fact that demand elasticity (substitute products) is not properly
accounted for. Thus a firm producing even 100 per cent of the supply
of something the demand for which is infinitely elastic would have no
monopoly power.'0 2 This is the case of the presence of an available
substitute product at a comparable price. A lower percentage of pro-
duction of a product which had no close substitutes would represent
a case of more effective monopoly power.
A similar criticism of statistical indices of power of the type de-
scribed relates to the market area included. Obviously a statistical
measure showing that no firm produced more than four or five per cent
of the country's sand and gravel would not be a particularly relevant
measure of monopoly power. High transportation costs in relation
to value would make it possible for a single firm in a small area to
restrict output and raise prices. Substantial power also means that
the rapid entry of new firms can be prevented.1'0 It is the difficulties
of defining markets, in addition to such factors as customer habits, the
effectiveness of advertising and product differentiation, that cause skep-
ticism about the usefulness of much of the concentration of economic
power data derived from census materials.
The questions which have been raised about the appropriateness
of industry, product or geographic market classifications, and which
in economic terminology are factors making for variation in the elas-
ticity of demand, are all relevant to the measure of monopoly power.
The power to monopolize is the ability to take advantage of the absence
of close substitutes for the product offered.'0 4 Competition, however,
is not dependent upon the availability of close substitutes: the elasticity
of demand for a single firm may be very great while the market de-
mand for a product is inelastic.
Under conditions of competition producers, irrespective of the
availability of substitutes, will increase production to that point at which
101. Studies of the percentage of sales, or assets accounted for by the largest
sellers, or the construction of Lorenz curves indicating the degree of departure
from equally apportioned business, are all of this general type.
102. See Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monwpoly
Power, 1 REv. Ecox. STuDIEs 157 (1933-34).
103. The qualification here is of special importance in considering effective
monopoly power in any other than the short run. The problem of entry is in part
the problem of potential competition as a market regulator.
104. Inasmuch as the limit of this power is set by the price of a substitute, at
the point of monopoly price demand may be said to be very elastic. (Another product
would be bought if the price were only a little higher.) Yet the ability to monopolize
depends upon the degree of inelasticity in the demand schedule.
TOWARD LESS MONOPOLY
the cost of the incremental unit of output is just covered by the price
(marginal cost equals price). Consequently a measure of the de-
parture of price from marginal cost, while not measuring potential
monopoly (monopoly power), does provide at least a valid guidepost
for testing the monopoly being exercised. 0 5 A measure of monopoly
power requires information concerning demand elasticity."0 6
Alternative Tests
The type and complexity of information required to determine
the presence of monopoly behavior has been indicated to be less com-
plicated than that required to determine monopoly power. Knowledge
of demand conditions is not essential in determining departures from
competitive practice. It is not to be implied that there is any simple
or easy rule which can be practically applied to show monopoly prac-
tices. The generally applicable rule-the departure of price from
marginal cost-raises the difficulty of adequately specifying marginal
cost, a procedure hardly less difficult than measuring demand elas-
ticity.
A number of alternative earmarks of monopoly have been sug-
gested which are indicative of conditions consistent with monopoly
but not with competition. Each of the following characteristics have
been said to be peculiarly associated with monopoly. It may be use-
ful to indicate their advantages and their limitations as indicators of
monopoly.'
0 7
a. An Identifiable Increase (or Decrease) in Marginal Cost Not
Reflected in Price.-An example cited as an illustration of this rule
clearly points up problems of measurement. 0 One is asked to suppose
that an excise tax of one dollar per unit is imposed on some product.
If price tends eventually to rise by about one dollar-the full amount
of the tax-the industry, it is said, can be considered as behaving com-
petitively in this respect. The rule is slightly qualified by noting that
under monopolistic conditions a rise in price of one dollar or more
would occur only with unique relations between cost and demand con-
ditions. The example is usable to distinguish competition from mo-
nopoly (even with the qualification noted) only if certain assumptions
are made. First, it must be noted that the example states if price
105. See note 102 supra.
106. NuTLR, THE EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES
1899-1939, 7 (1951).
107. More precisely they indicate monopoly behavior. But monopoly behavior,
of course, must entail some power.
108. See note 106 supra.
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eventually is raised by a dollar. Here reference is undoubtedly made
to long run results, after the number and size of the firms have had
an opportunity to adjust themselves to the new conditions. In this
respect alone, the rule could be applied only where adjustments would
be made almost spontaneously. Otherwise changes in other factors,
rather than the one the measurement of which is attempted, can occa-
sion the resulting price.10 9
Second, an equally important qualification, a monopoly might
raise price by the full amount of the tax in spite of the demand and
cost qualifications noted. The example assumes that the monopoly
exerts its full monopoly power before as well as after the tax-that is,
the monopoly price charged will be determined in such manner (mar-
ginal cost equals marginal revenue) that the full effect of the tax will
not be reflected in price. Here political factors cannot be ignored. The
steel industry provides a useful and interesting example. After World
War II, in a period of considerable inflation, but prior to the imposi-
tion of price controls, the prices of steel products were held to levels
which occasioned the need for non-price rationing. As a result so-
called gray markets developed in the steel business., 0  Subsequently,
when the steel industry announced price increases it was called before
a Senatorial committee to justify these increases. Obviously under
this kind of circumstance, an increase of price by the full amount of
a tax would hardly be evidence of pure competition in the steel business.
Numerous variations of the above kind of example might be il-
lustrated, each dealing with particular changes in marginal cost which
might be isolated. All of these would be subject to the kind of limita-
tions noted. Cases of known changes in demand without changes in
cost could provide similar examples. Here again difficulties of the
same sort present themselves. Without making proper provision for
the qualifications which have been indicated, tests of this sort are not
likely to be reliable. Moreover, the kind of information required to
meet the necessary qualifications involves information not easily ob-
tained.
b. The Existence of Non-Price Rationing.-A competitive price
being a price which equates the forces of supply and demand, the
existence in the market of buyers who are willing to buy more at the
existing price indicates a departure from competitive standards. The
existence of persistent non-price rationing by firms is consistent only
109. For example, a change in the level of demand (or in other costs) prior to
the establishment of the new equilibrium occasioned by the imposition of the tax.
110. The existence of these gray markets is itself a less ambiguous indication
of monopoly power than the example under review.
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with monopoly. In terms of monopoly behavior non-price rationing
is indicative of the fact that monopoly revenue is not being maximized,
at least in the short run, for the same amount of current sales could
be made at a higher price. Because it is usual to criticize monopoly on
the basis of "too high" prices and "excessive profits," this kind of
evidence is more often cited in commending than in condemning the
action of the firms involved. Such commendation comes from over-
looking or not understanding a basic (if not the basic) disadvantage
of monopoly-its effect upon resource allocation. Non-price ration-
ing indicates the forced diversion of existing resources from more ur-
gent to less urgent uses, regardless of whether the urgency of these uses
is thought to be the proper province of individual buyers or of some
central authority. The presence of voluntary non-price rationing pre-
sents one of the least ambiguous kinds of evidence of monopoly power
and one which is rather easily spotted.
c. Frequency and Amplitude of Price Change (Price Flexibility).
-An important property of competition is the automatic response of
price to changes in demand or cost. Price, under these conditions, will
tend to be flexible over time if there are changes in the price-determin-
ing variables. But this statement suggests a reliable test for competitive
behavior "' only if the opposite case (price rigidity) can be said to
characterize monopoly. A considerable amount of empirical evidence
has been collected which indicates that some highly concentrated (mo-
nopoly?) industries such as aluminum, magnesium, nickel, and busi-
ness machine rentals do exhibit a marked degree of price stability over
time" " but other evidence indicates that inflexibility and concentration
do not correlate very well."'
It is not at all apparent that the profit maximizing interests of a
monopolist will necessarily be achieved by a stable price structure. On
the contrary, one might expect that for a monopoly price to remain
stable over time would require either that marginal costs and demand
did not change or that increases or decreases in demand were sub-
stantially counteracted by increases or decreases in marginal costs.
It cannot be said that great change is consistent only with com-
petition. For given changes in the level of marginal cost, competitive
price would be likely to change more than monopoly price," 4 but for
111. See, for example, BAIN, PICING, DISTRIBUTION AND EMPLOYmNT, c. 4
(1948).
112. See Stigler, The Kinky Oligopoly Demand Curve and Rigid Prices, 55
J. POL. EcoN. 442 (1947).
113. See note 117 infra.
114. See previous discussion of the example of the imposition of a tax.
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given changes in the level of demand, monopoly price would be likely
to change more than competitive price. In any event no workable
guide for empirical testing would easily be provided because of diffi-
culties in isolating the numerous variables which could cause price
changes.
Although complete price rigidity does not seem to be consistent
with the exercise of maximum monopoly power at a particular point
of time, there are likely to be countervailing circumstances which
make price stability desirable to those having monopoly power. Long
run as contrasted to short run interests may make desirable rigid stable
prices. For example, even though a lower price would maximize cur-
rent revenue, the lower price might spoil a future market. Another
notable case is that of collusive or cooperative arrangements among
several firms."15 In such cases the losses which are occasioned by de-
parture from short run monopoly price are outweighed by the ease of
administering a fixed price agreement or the ease of detecting de-
partures from an agreement.
The applicability of a price rigidity test as an indicator of mo-
nopoly is dependent upon the availability of information concerning
the frequency and amplitude in the change of actual realized prices as
contrasted to reported published prices, and to changes in quality and
quantity of the items priced. A rigidity test is most appropriately used
for standardized or uniform commodities, but even then only if the
realized prices for these commodities are considerably more stable than
the significant elements of costs, particularly material and labor costs
which vary with output in such manner as not to be counterbalanced
by other costs.1 So prescribed, a useful test of monopoly involving
the utilization of price change data is a particular application of the
general rule for indicating the presence of monopoly by the disparity
between price and marginal cost, requiring information in addition to
the prices alone"1¢
d. The Existence of Excessive Profits.-The typical result of
monopolistic behavior is a limitation of production so that price is above
the level of marginal cost. Profits, however, are measured by the ex-
115. Rigidity may also conceivably result from such factors as the high cost
of price change, involving, for example, a large catalogue cost.
116. For example, if rail prices remained unchanged for several years, but the
price of the principal ingredients, labor and iron and steel materials, fluctuated fre-
quently and widely, there would seem to be present monopoly power to prevent the
prices of rails from reflecting these cost changes, unless other cost factors exactly
counterbalance them.
117. For confirmation see NAIL INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION AND PRICE IN-
FL.xixInTy 132 (Am. Council Pub. Affairs 1942): "These findings indicate that
whatever the incidence of concentration on a manufacturing economy, it is rather
futile to look for it in price behavior. .. .
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cess of revenue over total cost. Under either competitive (non-equilib-
rium) or monopoly conditions, profits may or may not exist for con-
siderable periods of time. This statement, of course, does& not mean
that there is not greater likelihood that profits will exist under mo-
nopoly, but it does mean that a monopolist will not always be able to
cover all costs. The declining industry provides an apt example.
Under competition profits tend to be eliminated. However, it is
not true that profits will not arise under competition when conditions
are changing. Moreover, meaning of profit as used in economic analy-
sis is much narrower than as used in accounting or business terminol-
ogy. Data are available only for the latter. Reported profits may
vary depending upon accounting procedures utilized. Business profits
normally include residual items which in economic terms are costs.
Typical of such cost items often included in reported business profits
are the cost of using funds on which actual interest charges are not paid
or contracted to be paid, self-insured risks, and provision for replacing
worn or obsolescent equipment at current cost.
Another kind of difficulty is presented by profit comparison. Com-
paring profits among competing companies can give rise to misleading
or erroneous results. Suppose, for example, an industry is composed
of 11 firms. The largest produces 50 per cent of a single product, and
each of the other firms produces approximately 5 per cent each. Un-
der these circumstances it is conceivable that the leading firm might
restrict production in order to charge a higher price irrespective of the
independent competitive action of the other firms. Under such cir-
cumstances (especially without collusion) the smaller firms could be
expected to expand production to the point where their marginal costs
equal price. They would thereby benefit at the expense of the larger
firm."8 Here, of course, is a typical example of the fact that monopoly
power in an industry benefits all members of the industry-here re-
striction benefits (profitwise) those who have the monopoly power
proportionately less than those who do not.
e. Price Discrimination.-Under perfectly competitive conditions
price discrimination on goods of the same kind sold in similar quantities
would be impossible. Buyers in a market would be indifferent to
sources of supply and sellers would be indifferent to the uses to which
the product would be put or the locations in which it would be used.
This is not the case for the monopolist. He must be concerned with
the demand characteristics of his product in order to maximize his
gain. If markets can be subdivided or customers segregated so that
118. Entry would not be rapid in such a case.
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a monopolist can charge more to some with urgent requirements and
less to others with less urgent requirements, such a course of action
will probably be followed because it tends to maximize net revenue.
Consequently, the presence of price discrimination has been stressed as
an important indicator of monopoly.
The existence of price discrimination, however, has been said to
evidence the existence of more active competition than would be likely
in its absence, even though not meeting perfectly competitive stand-
ards. An example may arise when, for reasons previously indicated,
stable prices are reqtiired for purposes of detecting departure from
prices set by prior agreement. In such a case the agreement itself
is an earmark of monopoly power, but one which may be difficult to
detect. Here different prices to different customers involving price
discrimination, charged either by a non-cooperating member of the
cartel or by an outsider, are a method by which the effectiveness of
such an arrangement can be destroyed. Cutting prices across the board
in a non-discriminatory fashion might be possible but would be more
easily detected and retaliated." 9
A similar case can be made with respect to price uniformity. A
uniform price in a market characterizes competition. It arises from
the principle of indifference among buyers and sellers. Competition
assumes general knowledge of alternatives on the part of buyers and
sellers. Nevertheless uniformity of prices has often been used as evi-
dence of conspiracy in antitrust cases. Courts generally have not been
impressed with analogies to competitive results when bids on contracts
are identical to three or four decimal places. Of course, if competi-
tion were effective enough bids would be superfluous because nobody
could be expected to bid less than the market price and no buyer would
pay more. Consequently, when conditions generally unfavorable to
competitive results are present, price uniformity (especially when bid
specifications make possible a wide variety of costing alternatives on
the part of individual bidders) can indicate the existence of less effec-
tive competition than would otherwise be present. In cases of this
kind another competitive requirement-knowledge (at least knowledge
by competitors of what others will do, or even detailed knowledge of
competitors costs)-may be a detriment to effective competition even
though perfect competition has been said to require thorough knowl-
edge and foresight.'
119. Those who favor laws against price discrimination have contended that the
situations in which price discrimination is defensible are capable of definition, and
in any event are very rare. See Hutt, The Nature of Aggressive Selling, 1 Eco-
N omICA 298, (N.S.) 319 n.2 (1935).
120. See KmHT, RIsK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT C. 3 (1921).
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Workable Competition
Because of the kinds of problems which have just been described,
in which departures from perfectly competitive conditions may or may
not represent departure from conditions of more effective competition
under the imperfect conditions found in actual markets, or (a contra-
dictory reason to the foregoing) because of a conviction by some that
too much competition is as great a danger to effective public policy as is
too little,""' considerable attention has been given in economic literature
in recent years to the formulation of possible standards for "workable"
competition. Workable competition in the latter sense raises important
public policy questions about anti-monopoly statutes.
V. Too MUcH ComPETITIoN?
Various standards for competitiveness have been suggested. Some
of the writers who have been concerned with workable competition
would be extremely critical of any tests (especially those relating to
the short run) of the kind that have just been discussed. Professor
Schumpeter, especially, makes this point when he discusses the incessant
revolutionizing change which characterizes the economic structure. 2 '
He calls it creative destruction. Note his criticism of static analysis of
monopoly performance (the kind included herein up to this point):
"But economists who, ex visu of a point of time, look for
example at the behavior of an oligopolist industry-an industry
which consists of a few big firms-and observe the well-known
moves and counter-moves within it that seem to aim at nothing
but high prices and restrictions of output are making precisely
that hypothesis. They accept the data of the momentary situa-
tion as if there were no past or future to it and think that they
have understood what there is to understand if they interpret the
behavior of those firms by means of the principle of maximizing
profits with reference to those data. . . . the problem that is
usually being visualized is how capitalism administers existing
structures, whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and
destroys them. As long as this is not recognized, the investigator
does a meaningless job. As soon as it is recognized, his outlook
on capitalist practice and its social results changes considerably.
The first thing to go is the traditional conception of the
modus operandi of competition. Economists are at long last
emerging from the stage in which price competition was all they
saw. As soon as quality competition and sales effort are admitted
into the sacred precincts of theory, the price variable is ousted from
121. The two types are too often not distinguished. The first type calls for a
more competitive result, the second for a less competitive result.
122. Scutrmp, CAPiTALisM, SOCAlSM AND DMGCRACY C. 7 (1942).
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its dominant position. .... it is not that kind of competition
which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the
new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of or-
ganization. . . . This kind of competition is as much more ef-
fective than the other as a bombardment is in comparison with
forcing a door.. .
With respect to potential competition, Schumpeter then says:
In many cases, though not in all, this will in the long
run enforce behavior very similar to the perfectly competitive
pattern." I
Except as to emphasis (and this is important) there is little here
that would be denied by economists of a wide variety of persuasions as
to the role of competition as a guide for public policy. On the other
hand, exclusive concern with long run considerations is consistent with
neither the purpose nor the interpretation of this country's anti-
monopoly law. Most price fixing pools, or market division agreements
which the Sherman Act is said to condemn unequivocally are of a short
run nature. That they contain the seeds of their own eventual destruc-
tion is not to say that they are necessarily desirable while they last.
The same may be said about similar market control exercised by the
single firm. Nothing in the above quoted passage by Professor Schum-
peter would seem to be inconsistent with attempting to achieve the
most effective competition possible in both the short and long run.
But Schumpeter goes farther. Trade restraints, he says, may ac-
tually be beneficial 24 for several reasons. First, the profits from re-
strictive activity, even in cases in which there is slow or balanced
growth, might provide an effective means by which to finance additional
growth. 5 Also, restrictive practices may do much to steady and al-
leviate temporary difficulties including not only general depression con-
ditions (such as existed during NRA) but particular cases in special
industries under the impact of new commodities and new technol-
ogies. 26 The possibility of monopoly gains, he says, provides essen-
tial incentive for productive effort by new as well as existing companies.
These arguments are not, however, meant to cover all cases of re-
strictive activity, but they do "show that there is no general case for
123. Id. at 84.
124. Id. at c. 8.
125. Id. at 87.
126. Protective devices such as patents, temporary secrecy, or long period con-
tracts secured in advance are only special cases of a larger class of restraints accord-
ing to Schumpeter. Id. at 88.
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indiscriminate 'trust busting' or for the prosecution of everything that
qualifies as a restraint of trade."
Here is the argument that price competition is no unmixed blessing
from the point of view of the public interest. This kind of argument,
especially as it relates to price fixing, division of markets, and other
conspiratorial activity covered by section 1 of the Sherman Act,
has long been rejected by courts. As early as 1898, Judge Taft said:
"It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistak-
ing, as we conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules
for determining the unreasonableness of restraints of trade, have
set sail on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to say, in
respect to contracts which have no other purpose and no other
consideration on either side than the mutual restraint of the
parties, how much restraint of competition is in the public in-
terest, and how much is not.
The manifest danger in the administration of justice accord-
ing to so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard would
seem to be a strong reason against adopting it." 127
That the courts reject the argument that particular limitations
on the rigors of price competition can be desirable in the public interest
does not dispose of the economic issues which are raised. Professor
Schumpeter's arguments, insofar as they carry conviction, would seem
to suggest moving in the opposite direction from Judge Hand,
diminishing the coverage of section 1 to conform with the less rigid
requirements of section 2.
The first reason given for the desirability of some monopoly is
that the surplus profits of the restrictions of the past provide the funds
for future growth. The source of investment funds is some form of
savings. High income receivers generally save more and spend less
than do low income receivers. It seems reasonable to expect that the
recipients of monopoly returns have higher than average incomes. Thus
monopoly is said to have an "income effect." In this sense anything
which made the rich richer and the poor poorer would in like manner
provide funds for future growth.
If monopoly provides more funds, these funds arise because of a
restriction of production in the monopolized area; but attention must
not be directed solely to this area. Lower outputs in the area of
monopoly divert labor and other resources to other areas-areas in-
volving less urgent demand. This diversion involves a reduction in the
total income of the community in real terms. Even if monopoly can
127. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271, 284 (6th Cir.
1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
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be said to augment savings in the monopoly area, there is no reason
for believing that the diversion of income to monopolists (who will
save relatively more and spend relatively less) is enough to outweigh
the loss in savings occasioned elsewhere in the economy by the re-
allocation of resources arising from the monopoly.
At best, the case that monopoly may provide needed funds for
additional growth is a tenuous one. The imponderables are numerous
and complex. Many would hold that insofar as the case rests on
creating greater income inequality, other and more serious economic
questions are raised. The case is far from compelling, however, in
the narrower context.
The merits of a case for larger investment funds involve knowing
why the existence of more funds than are provided under competition
is desirable. What is the proper amount of investment? How can
the "proper" amount of savings be determined better than through the
exercise of free choice in a competitive market? If monopoly results
in greater saving something else has to be given up. This loss may
not be counterbalanced by what was obtained. As Professor Arnold
Plant has pointed out,128 the other product which is foregone when
scarce factors are diverted for a particular use often escapes the atten-
tion of economic analysts. 129
Monopoly can also call for wasteful expenditure of capital funds.
There are numerous examples of funds being spent to "invent around"
patents. And the very process of duplicating unused existing facilities
of monopolists is a typical means by which monopoly is undermined.
Perhaps a substantial amount of new entry is of this type.
There is no more ground for deciding that the proper amount of
capital is provided by monopoly than there is -for deciding that the
proper amount of any product or service is produced under monopoly.
Such a conclusion runs counter to a fundamental principle of economics
concerned with the disposition of scarce economic resources in such
manner as to attempt to maximize the total utility to be derived from
an infinitely large variety of independent choices. The amount of
monopoly in the system has no fixed relationship to the "right" amount
of investment, and no rule for determining the proper amount of in-
vestment in the absence of the standard of the market place has been
forthcoming.
128. Plant, Economic Theory concerning Patents for Invention, 1 EcONOmICA
30 (1934).
129. The problem here is closely associated to another argument for monopoly
profit-that it provides the necessary incentive for new investment. The patent
analogy is dearer in this connection.
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The second principal reason which has been advanced for coun-
tenancing restraints of trade relates to the stabilizing effects of the re-
straints in ironing out fluctuations in general business activity, or al-
ternatively, in softening the effects of disruptive changes in particular
industries even in the absence of generally adverse conditions. These
;Ind closely related reasons represent a position which is much more
widely held and generally acclaimed than is the position that monopoly
makes available needed funds for industrial expansion. 3 ' Professor
J. M. Clark, for example, speaks of the ruinously low prices likely to
result from unlimited market chaos.'3" The thesis here is that im-
perfect competition may be too strong as well as too weak, and that
workable competition needs to avoid both extremes. Professor Clark
also holds that, when industry is in a chronic state of partly idle ca-
pacity, to insist that producers shall compete unchecked appears to
amount to inviting competition, and private enterprise with it, to
commit suicide."' Professor M. A. Adelman presents a similar point
of view:
"Over the whole business cycle, were there no restrictions
on competition, price would soar at one time and later plummet
down with incremental cost. Profits would fluctuate even more
violently, and capacity would be furiously and wastefully built
in the boom and then scrapped in the depression, accentuating
both." 13
Like views are expressed in the Report of the National Recovery Ad-
ministration on the Operation of the Basing Point System in the Iron
and Steel Industry:
Under the N.R.A. it [accepted standard of fair play
between business and business] has been extended to the avoid-
ance of cut-throat competition which would have generally de-
moralizing and disastrous effects on the business structure of in-
dustry, not confined to inefficient or badly-financed concerns." 14
130. Professor Schumpeter, however, applies the doctrine to all forms of trade
restraints, including apparently even collusive activity among competitors to fix
prices. See SCHUmpET, op. cit. mpra note 122. Most proponents of workable
competition would limit application to less obvious restraints.
131. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 30 AM. EcoN. REv. 241
(1940).
132. CLAIK, Ecoxomics OF OVERHEAD COSTS 435 (1923).
133. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 HARv. L. REv.
1289, 1346 (1948). The quotation should not imply that Professor Adelman does
not also recognize waste from the absence of competition. He goes on to say:
"Whether these wastes are greater or less than the wastes of the system which keeps
competition at some distance from industry never appears in the Cement and other
basing point cases." Id. at 1347.
134. NRA, REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE BASING POINT SYsMs IN THE
IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY 66 (1934).
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The need for trade restraint to make competition workable is not
newly recognized. A. J. Eddy, the intellectual god-father of "open
price competition" wrote in 1914: "The argument that the public may
profit by the demoralized prices that prevail for a time is more specious
than sound; it amounts to the proposition that the community profits
in the end from commercial savagery, from the ruin of its members.
,, 135
Running through much of this argument are the colorful adjec-
tives "ruinous," "cut-throat," "demoralizing," "chaotic," etc. They
have long been used by business men to describe competition to which
they are subjected, competition which they quite understandably do
not enjoy. Recently, and notably in the work of Professor J. M. Clark,
there has been an attempt to give these terms somewhat more precise
meaning. But a satisfactory answer as to why and how they should
be applied in the formulation of public policy still needs to be estab-
lished.
The principal difficulty here involves a now familiar question about
resource allocation. Do the advocates of stability through trade re-
straint directly meet it? Note what is considered a crucial case-a
particularly depressed industry, with high overhead costs, having cap-
ital equipment without alternative use, selling a product with an in-
elastic demand. It is said that when these conditions are present, active
price competition will drive down prices to the level of incremental
costs, which will be such a small proportion of total cost that even
the efficient members of the industry will be ruined." 6 This end is
presumed to result from marginal cost pricing in accordance with the
competitive norm. Two questions can be raised about the example.
The first involves the likelihood of the results forecast; the second re-
lates to the desirability of the assumed result.
The likelihood of the predicted results raises a serious question
as to only one part of the forecast. Competition will drive prices to
incremental costs; incremental costs in higher overhead cost industries
will, of course, represent a small part of total costs; and bankruptcy
or reorganization may, but not necessarily will, be required. On the
other hand, the predicted withdrawal of capital (which will be junked,
permanently retired or otherwise lost) from industry is not at all
clearly associated with the low prices which competition causes. Will
135. EDDY, TEE NEw ComPrrioN 252 (4th ed. 1915).
136. The only relevance of demand inelasticity in this situation is that it makes
possible a conclusion that the low prices occasioned by effective (ruinous?) price
competition, with the dire consequence forecast, would be unnecessary. Moreover,
demand inelasticity means more restriction on employment and output in the industry
as a result of few as compared to many sellers.
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resources in the long-run be wasted because of a plant scrapping rate
induced by free competition?
Whether a plant or production machinery which is neither worn
out nor obsolescent will be scrapped will depend on its usefulness in
current production. [Here such usefulness is assumed to be small.
Even less plant would be useful under less competitive conditions with
higher prices and lower outputs.] Also scrapping will depend upon
the expectation of future use. But either there is an expectation of
future use or there is not. If there is not, it is difficult to see why a non-
competitive firm has less reason to scrap plant than a more competi-
tive one. In fact the opposite case would seem more reasonable, unless
the existence of the currently maintained prices somehow makes for
different behavior-perhaps a psychology of optimism predicated on
the fact of current solvency. But even if this is true of firms which
are avoiding losses, and even if the opposite (pessimism) can be
said to characterize those which are losing money because they are
covering only incremental costs, it is not sufficient to justify a predic-
tion of a higher scrapping rate for existing plants. It is necessary to
assume further that there is nobody else in the community who thinks
highly enough of the future prospects to pay more than scrap value.
Whether bankruptcy or reorganization occurs has no rational rel-
evancy to the question of whether or not existing facilities will be
scrapped. The relevant considerations to plant scrapping, in both
good times and bad, involves a question of the relative value of the
facilities in all of their alternative uses as compared to their value as
junk. The fact that only one alternative non-scrap use has been as-
sumed does not change the nature of the calculation. Moreover, the
amount of the funds expended for the facilities and the relative part
the fixed costs which they represent play in total costs is also irrelevant
to the determination of whether or not the facilities will be scrapped.
Insofar as the present value of expected earnings of plants or plant
facilities exceeds scrap value, facilities can be expected to be used. Of
course, perfect forecasting is never possible. But this kind of im-
perfection is not overcome by the introduction of trade restraints.
The problems of uncertainty and instability created by generally
depressed market conditions present serious problems of public policy.
A serious depression could engender pessimism which would create
conditions forcing abandonment of facilities which may well be needed
in the future. But here again, the question relates to resource al-
location-whether the misallocation of resources caused by departure
from marginal cost pricing has any necessary connection with the
achievement of a generally stable price level.
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At any particular time many plants and facilities need to be
scrapped. There would be a waste of the country's resources if they
were not scrapped. Others need to be shifted to alternative use.
Here it is the dynamics of change (creative destruction in Schum-
peter's language) that calls for competition (not its absence) so that
new demands can be accommodated quickly and efficiently.
The need for bankruptcy or reorganization arises in many in-
stances from differences in the capital structure which have nothing to
do with the operation of the firm's productive facilities. Two steel
firms, for example, operating with a substantial portion of their fa-
cilities idle, and each having large and expensive fixed plant facilities,
may well be faced with very different prospects for staying solvent.
Suppose the capital of one of these firms is entirely in the form of
equity securities (common stoclks) and that of the other in non-equities
(bonds). Competitive pricing may be "ruinous" to the second and not
to the first if "ruinous" is thought to be related to.the need for re-
organization. There is no reason to suppose that resources will be
withdrawn from one and not from the other, however. No satis-
factory answer has been provided which indicates that bankruptcy or
reorganization caused by too much competition is undesirable. Legal
recognition is merely given to what has happened.
Finally, the question remains whether the existence of some mo-
nopoly (including trade restraints by sellers acting jointly) is required
to provide the necessary profit incentive for maximum productive
effort. The same, or a closely related problem, has been described as
the problem of uncertainty.3 7 "The main implication of a program
of workable competition," says Professor Fellner, "is to decide, on
the basis of the specific information available for individual industries,
what degree of competition is obtainable by methods of practical policy
without substantial loss of technological efficiency at the time when the
policy is adopted, and does not presumably create a degree of un-
certainty such as would offset the advantages." 18' (Emphasis added.)
Here again the possibility is suggested that there is something in
the "dynamics" of capitalistic progress which may overcome the ac-
knowledged disadvantages of less than maximum efficiency in resource
allocation available under competition when viewed at a single point
of time-'"statics." Fellner says, for example: "It seems reasonable
to maintain as a general proposition that a market structure compares
favorably with another if it brings somewhat worse allocation of re-
137. FELLNER, CoMPEM-rrxoN AmoNG THE FEw c. 11 (1949).
138. Id. at 289. Technological efficiency has long been recognized as a limitation
on competitive behavior. See Section II of this article. The problem here is to see
what else is involved.
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sources on a "static" level but, at the same time, markedly speeds up
technological advance, especially if it also improves the distribution
of income." ' That less, rather than more, competition is likely
to bring about this result is subject to considerable doubt. In fact
Fellner's analysis provides very good reasons for supposing that this
is an unlikely case. 4 But even if it is significant, in order to evaluate
this justification it is necessary to know why particular "technological
advance" sponsored by departures from competition is desirable. Here
the incentive which less competition provides is suggested to be the in-
centive to technological change or product variation. But profits (and
losses) arise under competition when conditions are changing..4 1 Com-
petition here creates incentive. Moreover, the Fellner point is very
similar to the previous argument concerning the availability of funds
provided by monopoly. The position is vulnerable on similar
grounds.142 There just is no system of economic calculus which can
prove that the social gain from new productive facilities and technical
changes or innovations created by monopoly offsets the loss of other
output.
The principal form of uncertainty is that connected with the sale
price of products.14 "The main immediate sources of uncertainty are
the amount of supply to be expected from other producers and the con-
sumers' wants and purchasing power." 14 It is the anticipation of
future income from sales which does provide the incentive to expand
production as well as to embark on new ventures. What is the rela-
tionship of monopoly to this general problem of incentive (prospective
profits) ? Is some restraint on the amount of price competition that
would otherwise prevail an essential carrot to be dangled before the
donkey of industrial progress? If it is true that the expectation of
some form of monopoly profit makes it desirable to increase production
and to adopt better production methods, does not competition do more?
Competition makes it essential.
139. Id. at 286.
140. Ibid. Fellner points out that broadening of market structures will frequently
stimulate progress and a further narrowing will impede it. Feltner's opinion seems
to be characterized in the following: "The more incomplete the co-ordination of
business policies with respect to these variable [technological change and product
variation], the more likely does it become that firms introduce changes which are
partly at the expense of competitors rather than merely the changes which a
monopolist would also adopt." Ibid. See also id. at 287 n.2.
141. It need not be assumed that every departure from a stationary competitive
economy identifies monopoly, even though short-run quasi-rents may be involved.
Schumpeter and others seem to so identify monopoly with departures from stationary
competition.
142. See text at note 128 et seq.
143. KNIGUT, Op. cit. sipra note 120, at 317.
144. Id. at 318.
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It is not necessary to state categorically that the only incentive
which monopoly in its various forms can provide in the public interest
are those which would have been produced were the monopoly ab-
sent. There are cases which Professor A. C. Pigou discusses as
divergences between marginal social net product and marginal trade
net product.145  Here the effects of employing a unit of resource fail
to be reflected in the remuneration of the person responsible for the
investment. Some of the examples which Professor Pigou cites are
applicable to the monopoly case and some are not. No incentive, for
example, is provided for the private construction of a lighthouse, the
services for which no toll can be collected, and a lighthouse is about
as non-competitive an enterprise as can be imagined. On the other
hand, a patent system provides a clear case in which the social net
product of new inventions is thought to be greater than the trade net
product which would accrue to inventors if they were not given mo-
nopoly protection." Even here, it should not be overlooked, how-
ever, that-"Insofar as the new enterprises compete for their resources,
capital and labour, in open competition with existing businesses, econo-
mists have strong grounds for the presumption that the gains from
their success will outweigh the losses. If, however, innovation is es-
pecially encouraged, to the loss of other production, by monopoly price
conditions, is it not conceivable that there may be 'too much invention
of the wrong kind' . . . ?" 14
The case for "too much price competition" is far from convincing.
It creates more economic problems than it solves, and provides no con-
ceivable guide for appropriate public policy. The "sea of doubt" upon
which Judge Taft refused to embark his legal craft is no more suitable
for economic excursions. Legal rules calling for price competition
contain sound economic insight or intuition. More recent decisions
which affirm and strengthen them may not be dismissed summarily
on economic grounds by vague references to newer notions of competi-
tion. If it had become necessary for courts to distinguish good cartels
from bad cartels, or just prices from unjust prices, or to distinguish
offsetting innovation advantages in determining the legality of price
fixing arrangements, antitrust laws would probably have become un-
enforceable, or have been converted to instruments for increasing busi-
ness regimentation.
145. PiGou, EcoNomIrs oF WELFARE c. 11 (4th ed. 1932).
146. This and similar examples, however, do not provide a case for countenancing
private monopoly. They provide, rather, examples of legitimate fields for social
control.
147. Plant, supra note 128, at 51. See also a similar point on trade-marks by
Chamberlin, quoted in note 148 infra.
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VI. CONCEPTS OF WORKABILITY
Up to this point the discussion of "workable competition" has
been limited to questions regarding the alleged advantages of less,
rather than more, competition. A considerable amount of discussion,
also included under the phrase "workable competition," has as its ob-
jective not a rationalization of less competition but rather the achieve-
ment of the maximum competition which particular types of markets
make possible. The previous discussion of price discrimination (IV)
although recognizing the inconsistency of price discrimination with
perfectly competitive conditions, suggests that its presence may bring
about a condition of more competition than would otherwise prevail.
Other similar examples have been cited as involving problems of work-
ability.'
48
Many economists who would not agree that there is real danger
from too much competition are interested in the problem of workable
competition (sometimes referred to as effective competition), which
has as its goal achieving maximum competition in any particular market
structure. But more often workability is defined in terms of the
amount of monopoly that may safely be tolerated irrespective of how
much more might be desirable. An example is Professor Wilcox's
tentative definition of workable competition: "An industry is workably
competitive when (1) there are a considerable number of firms selling
closely related products in each important market area, (2) these firms
are not in collusion, and (3) the long run average cost curve for a
new firm is not materially higher than for an established firm." 141
An almost identical test of workability has been suggested by
Professor Mason. After pointing out the nature of the problem
("None of the markets encountered meet the tests of pure com-
petition; at the same time they fall short of a degree of monopoly
justifying public regulation. What is the test of effective competi-
tion?"), Mr. Mason goes on to say: "Workable competition is con-
148. Product differentiation has been described as indicative of monopoly. It
has also been described as competition in quality. Given heterogeneous tastes it is
suggested that a great deal of product differentiation seems to be consistent with
maximum welfare. See, for example, Chamberlin, Prodict Heterogenlity and
Public Policy, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. Surp. 85 (1950). But see also CHAMBERLiN, THE
THEORY OF MONOPOusTc COmPETION 249 (5th ed. 1947) : "The question [of evalu-
ating trade-mark monopoly] is one of weighing variety at a higher price against a
more uniform product at a lower one. . . Since less monopoly would be created,
[if trade-marks were not fully protected] there would be less attention given to try-
ing to create it and correspondingly more to production." (Emphasis added.)
149. Stigler, The Extent atd Bases of Monopoly, 32 AM. Ecow. REV., Supp. PT.
2 (1942). Stigler comments here that the first two points serve to eliminate not only
monopoly and explicit collusion but also tacit avoidance of competition for fear of
retaliation by close rivals. The reference to collusion here is clearly something
to be avoided in a standard for workability. Compare this with standards of work-
ability (Section V) where the advantage of some collusion is alleged.
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sidered to require, principally, a fairly large number of sellers and
buyers, no one of whom occupies a large share of the market, the
absence of collusion among either group, and the possibility of market
entry by new firms." 11i0
The first two requirements of workability, a large number of
sellers and the absence of collusion, are consistent with a standard
free competition for the short as well as the long run. Here recogni-
tion is given to the fact that the theoretical presumption in an economy
of private enterprise is in favor of the market; 15r that is, if collusive
or cooperative activity takes the place of competition, then it is pos-
sible to exercise a degree of economic power (monopoly power) that
is inconsistent with the most effective use of the nation's resources.
Here is economic justification of the rule 'against trade restraints
(such as price fixing) which are outlawed by section 1 of the Sherman
Act. Extension of this position by analogy to price fixing, as we have
seen, gave rise to Judge Hand's "power rule" and brought about the
conclusion of "monopolizing" in the Aluminum case.
In the foregoing discussion of Judge Hand's opinion in the
Aluminum Company case, a question was raised about the desirability
of applying a monopoly power test of illegality only in those instances
in which the percentage of output was in excess of 64 to 90 per cent.
If production of a product (without closely competing substitutes) is
confined to several firms (each producing, for example, one third of
the output), the first tenet of workability, a substantial number of
sellers, does not seem to be met, irrespective of the vagueness of a stand-
ard phrased in terms of "a substantial number." Nor does current in-
terpretation of the Sherman Act directly meet this economic problem.
Indirectly it may, however, by broadened coverage of what may be
deemed conspiratorial activity under section 1: ". . . it is enough
to warrant a finding of a 'combination' within the meaning of the
Sherman Act, if there is evidence that persons with knowledge that
concerted action was contemplated and invited, give adherence to and
then participate in a scheme." 152
The kind of language just quoted has been said to cast doubt on
the legality of numerous arrangements in which price leadership occurs.
Such activity has been variously referred to by such terms as "conscious
parallelism" and "spontaneous coordination." These terms are legally
150. Mason, The Current Status of the Monopoly Problem in the United States,
62 HARv. L. RxV. 1265, 1267 (1949).
151. Advocates of workable competition would stress, however, that these pre-
sumptions may often be rebutted by the facts. See, for example, Adelman, Integra-
tion and Antitrust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REV. 29 (1949).
152. FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 716 n.17 (1948).
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relevant only insofar as they evidence conspiracy or collusive be-
havior. 5 ' If conspiracy can be inferred, it is relevant not only for
establishing a violation of section 1 but also for establishing a vio-
lation of section 2, either as evidence of illegal purpose or intent or
as a method of lumping firms together to reach the crucial power per-
centage (64 to 90). It is possible, therefore, that a firm, though not
within the scope of Judge Hand's power rule in the Alcoa case, can
through "conspiracy" with others, be brought within the coverage of
section 2. Thus, as in American Tobacco Co. v. United States, decided
after the Alcoa case, where "the authorities support the view that the
material consideration in determining whether a monopoly exists is
not that prices are raised and that competition actually is excluded
but that power exists to raise prices or to exclude competition," "I
the relevant power which is referred to is the power of a group of
independent sellers acting in concert. It is not inconceivable, for ex-
ample, that joint use of a formula pricing scheme (basing point sys-
tem) could give rise to the Alcoa result in the steel industry. 5
This, of course, represents a somewhat different concept of power
than that represented by the court in United States v. United States
Steel Corp.' in which the Gary dinners were used as evidence of
the fact that U. S. Steel was without monopoly power: "Its power was
efficient only when in cooperation with its competitors" and "in and of
itself [U. S. Steel] is not now and never has been a monopoly or a
combination in restraint of trade. . .. " (Emphasis added.) '
It seems important to emphasize that the definitions of workability
which have been cited call for a substantial number of firms as well
as for the absence of collusion. The Sherman Act, as has been in-
dicated, has been interpreted to place almost exclusive emphasis on
the latter.
153. But see Milgram v. Loew's, Inc., 192 F.2d 579 (3d Cir. 1951). The con-
cept of conspiracy is capable of considerable extension. For example: "The voicing
of the same invalid reasons for identical equivocal action is of itself sufficient from
which to infer guilt." Id. at 585.
154. 328 U.S. 781, 811 (1946).
155. For an analysis of basing point pricing systems as indicative of collusive
behavior, see Stigler, A Theory of Delivered Price Systems, 39 Ami. EcoN. Rv.
1143 (1949); MACHLUP, TaE BASING POINT SYSTEM (1949); Bowman, Book Re-
view, 17 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 218 (1949). See also references in Markham, The
Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, 41 Amt. EcoN. REV. 891 (1951) ; FE=za,
MASQUE1ADE OF MONOPOLY (1931).
156. 251 U.S. 417 (1920).
157. Id. at 440-441. Fetter has criticized this view severely. "Only a
singular ignorance of the history of the American trust movement as well as of the
theory of monopoly," he said, "could make it possible for anyone, judge or layman,
to believe that monopoly is monopoly only when acting without the compliance and
cooperation of smaller competitors." FETrER, MASQUMADE OF MONOPOLY 83 (1931).
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The argument might be made that the requirement of a substan-
tial number of sellers is unnecessary if the legal concept of conspiracy
is stretched to cover all cases where there is substantial departure from
competitive behavior. A tendency in this direction seems to char-
acterize recent court decisions. It is, of course, not impossible that
the interpretation of conspiracy under the Sherman Act will come to
encompass most price leadership examples. With the application of
broader conspiracy concepts arise problems of evidence, which are at
least as difficult as those which have been raised concerning the recog-
nition of monopoly or monopoly power.1' s  What is required is not
solely related to a definition of conspiracy. Equally important is a
method of recognizing significant departure from the most effective
competition that can be achieved.
The need for a substantial number of competitors for effective
competition has been stressed by Professor Fellner.5 9 After point-
ing out various reasons why oligopolistic coordination falls short of
that degree of coordination (monopolizing?) achieved by a single firm,
he points out the impossibility of forcing rival firms to disregard the
effects of their moves on one another:
"No one can be forced to behave as if he possesses less intelligence
than he really does. Specific manifestations of oligopolistic co-
ordination can be suppressed. But in each case where this is
done, it is necessary to ask the question as to what other manifesta-
tions of oligopolistic co-ordination are likely to show if certain
business policies are outlawed." 16'
Subsequently he stated: "Unless the basic characteristics of market
structure itself are changed, the objectionable market results will be
promptly replaced by different but equally oligopolistic results." 161
Here is the economic rationale for at least the presumptive desirability
of as large a number of competing sellers as possible. 6 2  In United
States v. National Lead Co.'1  Mr. Justice Burton pointed out that
there was no showing that four major competing units would be
preferable to two. The analysis here would at least suggest that a
158. The relevant question here would be whether or not the activity alleged to
be collusion was susceptible of only one explanation-a mutual desire to avoid
competition. Is the activity of any two sellers which is not consistent with an
economist's definition of that behavior which active competition would require evi-
dence of collusion?
159. Fellner, Collusion and Its Limits Under Oligopoly, 40 Am. ECoN. Rnv.
Sup. 54 (1950).
160. Id. at 58.
161. Id. at 59.
162. It is suggested that "... effective price leadership, for the most part, is a
result of monopoly rather than a cause of it. . . ." Markham, The Nature and
Significance of Price Leadership, 41 Am. EcoN. REv. 891, 894 (1951).
163. 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
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greater number of competitors is more likely rather than less likely,
to bring about competitive results.
The third requirement of workable competition-the possibility
of market entry by new firms-may be alternatively stated by the gen-
eral condition that the long run average cost curve for a new firm is
not materially higher than for an established firm. Unlike the other
two requirements for workability, this requirement, that there be no
substantial impediments to new entry, has influence only in terms of
long run results. If the number of firms contemplated by "substan-
tial" is large enough, and the kind of activity contemplated to be
covered under the term "collusion" is broad enough, there would not
be need for concern over problems of entry of new firms. Competi-
tive practice might be assumed from existing firms. It must be pre-
sumed, therefore, that the two previous conditions for workability are
such as to at least make possible a substantial departure from competi-
tive results.
A discussion of the impediments to entry as a barrier to the
achievement of workable competition may be alternatively stated as
questions of why the existing firms (assumed to be few in number)
constitute the industry, and how long they can be expected to main-
tain this position.Y6 4 As to the first question (why there are so few),
a number of reasons have been suggested. Among the more important
are: (1) Patents (including patent pooling arrangements and un-
patented "know how"); (2) control over essential resources (labor
or material); (3) large capital requirements; (4) mergers or con-
solidations; (5) temporary aggressive pricing to drive out new en-
trants (discrimination or other abusive practice); (6) control over
market outlets; (7) economics of scale (including both production
economies and economies of selling and research).
Explaining the existence of "a few" firms by such reasons as
the first six listed is principally useful in shifting the locus of the
monopoly problem rather than solving the question how much mo-
nopoly may be tolerated-the principal reason for the existence of a
concept of workable competition. Moreover, why the existence of such
conditions (for example, the existence of patents, or control of re-
sources, or control over markets) should necessarily limit the number
of producers in an industry is by no means so clear as is generally
contended.
Suppose for example, a single steel producer controlled all of an
essential raw material, iron ore. Would this be a logical reason for
the existence of only one or a few steel making firms even in the ab-
164. Stigler, Discussion, 40 Am. Ecox. REv. Surp. 63 (1950).
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sence of substitute product such as scrap? Why treat the monopoly
problem here as a dubious problem of entry into the steel business when
the obvious problem involves a direct attack on the monopoly of
ore? 165 And, of course, whether or not the relaxation of the as-
sumption of only one ore seller still leaves a monopoly problem de-
pends upon exactly the same kind of a measurement problem for which
an answer is being sought. Attention is merely shifted to another
industry.
Furthermore, if a monopoly of ore is assumed to exist, but for
some reason no direct legal attack can be made at that level (an ap-
proximation of the patent case), it is at least arguable that the interests
of the ore monopolist would be served not by extending monopoly
power into the steel industry, but rather by sponsoring maximum com-
petition in steel to increase steel production and thereby increase the
consumption of ore. The case is, of course, not limited to raw ma-
terial control. Market control, or patent control raises an identical
problem.
Price discrimination has been criticized as a means of preventing
new companies from entering an industry.166 A typical case involves
specific price cuts by an existing firm or firms directed solely to the
limited market of the new entrant. After the entrant has become dis-
couraged and has withdrawn, prices are then raised to the old level.
The undesirability of this kind of activity has long been recognized.
The Clayton and Robinson-Patman -Acts specifically condemn this
kind of discrimination; and purposely restraining entry into a field
has long been held illegal under the Sherman Act.
The ability to use price discrimination for non-competitive results
(such as control over new entry) depends upon the existence of suffi-
cient economic power to manipulate price successfully. The exist-
ence of such power gives rise to the question of its source; and once
again the problems of measurement are suggested. Even if the desir-
able effects of any discrimination are denied, will alternative means
of exercising this power for similar results be available?
Another circumstance which is said to be a significant barrier
to the entrance of new firms into an industry is a requirement of a
large amount of financial resources. The need for capital, of course,
165. Assuming forward integration from the ore business to the steel business
by the ore monopolist does not change the nature of the problem. Such integration
may, of course, be rational in the absence of competition at the forward level, but
then only if the ore monopolist could avoid paying the discounted market value of
the monopoly in the steel business. Monopoly in both ore and steel may also make
the vertical integration desirable to maximize the return of both, but .it could hardly
be said to explain either.
166, Railroad rebates in the early history of the oil industry are often cited as
an example.
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is closely associated with the necessary amount of productive equip-
ment required to carry on a successful operation. The point is closely
related to the problem of economics of scale-particularly the efficiency
of small scale as contrasted to large scale producing facilities. This
is not to say, however, that the barrier is capital requirements. High
capital requirements are not necessarily related to economies of scale.
Insofar as entry into an industry requires a large degree of integration,
either backward to assure necessary sources of raw materials or for-
ward for assured market outlets, the amount of investment required
for new entry can be substantially increased even though the additional
functions are not essential for efficiency.
A pertinent question with respect to financial requirements as a
bottleneck to the entry of new competitors is what causes the limitations
on funds for new enterprise. The usual explanation of potential com-
petition (the threat of entry) as a market regulator is that when mo-
nopoly power of existing firms is exercised by restriction of output
and by increased prices, this result (except in the case of declining
cost industries or in industries which because of demand conditions
do not cover total cost in spite of the exercise of monopoly power)
will make for higher than average rates of return for newcomers in
the fields in which the monopoly is being exercised. If such a situa-
tion exists and a market for investment funds exists, why are not funds
forthcoming even in large amounts? If they are not forthcoming be-
cause of such factors as uncertainty of future prices or demand, or
danger of retaliation by existing firms, or control by existing firms over
strategic supplies or markets, or control over patents or exclusively
held skills or "know how," then it is, to say the least, misleading to
attribute the failure of entry to the most apparent reason facing the
prospective entrant-the unavailability of funds. In many cases the
unavailability of large amounts of funds merely reflects the real causes.
It is well known, moreover, that the very existence of a very
broad market in investment securities makes possible the accumulation
of very large amounts of investment funds from a wide variety of
sources. The fact that business is no longer dependent for funds upon
the personal savings of the enterpriser himself and his close friends
has greatly expanded the amount of funds which are available not
only for existing businesses but also for prospective new entrants.
That risks and uncertainties are higher for the latter, or that in some
cases funds may not be forthcoming at all, is not necessarily evidence
that large financial requirements are the real barrier to entry.
67
167. Corporate savings of existing firms provide a large part of the funds going
for new plant investment. These are not costless funds to existing firms, however.
The apparent advantage they provide over new entrants may merely reflect low
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Professor Stigler lists the cigarette industry as a striking example
of capital requirements as a barrier to entry. He points out:
"There are no economies of scale in production but there are some
economies in advertising, partly because of the nature of the ad-
vertising media, partly because advertising over a long period
has cumulative effects. As a result of the scarcity of large equities,
the three big companies have maintained large profits and dom-
inance over the domestic market for more than thirty years."
(Emphasis added.) 168
It is not clear, however, that financial requirements are necessarily the
barrier to entry. The difficulties in obtaining funds could reflect risks
or even economies of scale. It is interesting to note that Philip Morris
and Co. in 1949, while spending some $17.5 million for sales and gen-
eral administrative expenses on gross sales of $228 million, produced
and advertised seven different brands of cigarettes in addition to smok-
ing tobacco. Prior to the acquisition of the Axton-Fisher Tobacco
Company in 1944 the company had one producing plant. Two are
now operated. At least with respect to advertising of minor brands
of cigarettes, it is difficult to understand what "financial" advantage
due to advertising accrues to Philip Morris which would be a sub-
stantial barrier to a much smaller company.
In a great many industries the small number of firms may be ex-
plained by the merger of existing firms. It is a popular conception
that these mergers are arranged to achieve more efficient utilization
of the facilities involved. At least as plausible is the theory that they
are arranged to avoid or eliminate competition. This statement is es-
pecially true of horizontal mergers-mergers of competing concerns
at the same level in the production process. Merger of competing
producers provides a possible means of achieving monopoly power
while avoiding a charge of collusion under the Sherman Act. Al-
though with respect to future mergers, section 7 of the Clayton Act
as recently amended 169 might be said to prevent acquisitions the effect
of which may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create
dividend rates to stockholders or excess earnings due to the exercise of monopoly
power. They do not necessarily reflect cost savings so substantial as to impede
entry. Advantage is provided only insofar as higher than competitive rates are
charged for floating new security issues, or savings in costs are achieved over pro-
curing funds elsewhere. But even in this case the larger the quantity of funds re-
quired from investment, sources the less this advantage is likely to be. See SEC
studies on cost of securities by size of issue, supra note 90.
168. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRica 227 (1952).
169. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950). Section 7 of the
Clayton Act as now amended forbids both the acquisition of stock and assets in com-
peting companies where the effect is or may be to lessen competition.
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monopoly, it is not clear as yet what can be done here that is impossible
under the Sherman Act? °0 Moreover, as to past mergers, divesting
formerly merged properties requires not only a finding of violation of
monopolizing or attempting to monopolize in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act, but also the necessity of convincing a court that di-
vestiture is a necessary requirement to the reestablishment of condi-
tions of effective competition.
The absence of a substantial control created by horizontal merger
generally has not been listed as a necessary requirement for work-
ability by the advocates of workable competition. The requirement of
a large number of sellers, even apart from its vagueness, does not
necessarily encompass all the cases of substantial monopoly power
arising through mergers. Irrespective of the existence of a large
number of unmerged companies, the resulting economic power residing
in the merged companies is not less than if these same companies were
in collusion. Why is the latter inconsistent with workable competition
and not the former? With respect to possible effect upon entry the
cases are not different. An assumption that mergers (especially hori-
zontal mergers) should be tolerated because of the requirements of
economies of scale seems dubious. That economies of large scale makes
monopoly conditions inevitable is not a reason for tolerating mergers.
Mergers can not correct past mistakes as to plant scale 171 or product
specialization.172
Reliance on long run effects of easier entry to overcome the short
run monopoly achieved through merger may make for an unnecessarily
large loop hole in anti-monopoly policy. Professor Stigler has de-
veloped this point at length: "If the entry of new firms is not too rapid,
the merger may make monopoly profits for a considerable period; and,
even though thereafter the losses are permanent, their discounted value
need not be so large as to wipe out initial gains." 173 Here is an ex-
planation of the exercise of declining monopoly power which may be
effective for long periods of time. In many industries, especially those
170. See 46 Ii.. L. Ray. 444 (1951) (discussion of effectiveness of § 7 of the
Clayton Act as amended).
171. It cannot be argued that merger might hasten this result in the interest of
more rapidly achieving efficiency. The same facilities exist as before. The past mis-
takes in building too many facilities are not corrected by merger, even though similar
plants will not be built again.
172. Competition would presumably force the most efficient result in the absence
of merger. The case involves the question of plant divisibility, essentially a problem
of scale of operations. See note 171 supra.
173. Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. Supe. 23, 25
(1950).
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with a large proportion of fixed assets, it may take a long time to
achieve a condition of long run equilibrium.
"If the specialized resources of the merger are not indestructible,
investment can be withdrawn from the industry so that, after the
initial period of gain and a subsequent period of loss, the long
run equilibrium will be attained, with the merger receiving a
competitive rate of return on its investment in the industry. (The
period of loss arises because in general it requires less time to
increase than to withdraw investment.) If the industry's de-
mand is growing, the amount of resources the merger must with-
draw will be reduced; and, if the demand is growing sufficiently
rapidly, no investment need be withdrawn: the merger can main-
tain its absolute size but decline in relative size." 14
The steel industry provides a good example. Ease of entry, to-
gether with conditions under which it can take place rapidly, can create
"potential" competition and, as Mr. Corwin Edwards has pointed out,
"reduce the likelihood of collusive agreement . . moderate the re-
strictions in agreements actually made . . . lessen the restrictive effect
of concentrated control over production or purchases, and . . . dimin-
ish the advantage which the most powerful enterprise can obtain
through coercion"; I' but to hold that this action is enough safeguard
to assure effective competitive pricing 17 6 would be tantamount to say-
ing that no law against price fixing or market allocation is required in
the interest of maintaining effective competition. Such a position,
while representing the view of perhaps the majority of economists at
the time of the passage of the Sherman Act in 1890,117 is scarcely heard
today-at least in this extreme form. The merger case is not essen-
tially different from the cartel case which is so generally disparaged.
In fact, it is likely to be worse. Mergers allow less freedom for inde-
pendent action than do cartels, are less limited in the amount of monop-
oly power they can exercise, and represent much more permanent forms
of organization. Voluntary agreements can be breached and often are
breached.
More vigorous competition would be achieved if there were (1)
more sellers (2) less collusion, and (3) easy entry of new firms. These
standards of workable competition are relevant and important. In
fact, the recommendations of this study may be viewed as a means of
implementing (1) (increasing the number of sellers). The problem
174. Ibid.
175. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING CoMPrrION 186 (1949).
176. This statement is not to imply that Mr. Edwards holds this view.
177. See, for example, CLARK, THE FEDERAL TRUST PoLIcYt c. 5 (1931).
TOWARD LESS MONOPOLY
is not, however, how much monopoly can safely be tolerated. The more
important question is whether the entire community would be better
off with more competition than now exists. An affirmative answer
is required. The principle limiting factor to the desirability of more
competition is found in economies of scale. This factor involves a
question of whether the real cost (excluding monopoly advantages of
bargaining) of producing a product are such that the market can only
be supplied efficiently by a small number of firms; or, more broadly, of
whether the advantage of the competition created by a larger number
of firms is outweighed by the real costs of obtaining the needed pro-
duction under these conditions.
There are differences of informed opinion as to the importance
of economies to be derived from very large scale production. These
differences, however, relate primarily to optimum plant size. Whether
or not so limited there is a tendency to adopt the popular view-the
bigger the better. It is not necessary to enter this controversy here.
Considerable progress toward less monopoly (more competition) can
be achieved in the public interest without departing from Judge Hand's
"thrust upon it" rule. It is not suggested that a presumption of mo-
nopoly may no longer be rebuttable by establishing economies of scale.
It is suggested that the standard of presumption needs attention.
It is indefensible economically to limit what Judge Hand has called
"partial monopoly" to such cases of joint action as are covered by
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Single firms with far less than 90
per cent of the production of an industry can and do exert monopoly
power. To extend Judge Hand's monopoly power rule in civil cases
(to multi-plant firms producing 10 or 15 per cent of the output for
a market) would buttress a long-avowed public policy which supports
free competitive enterprise.
178
178. Notable success has not accompanied world-wide attempts (not excluding
the United States) to supplant or improve upon the competitive market as a means
of determining how much of what should be made when, where, how, by whom and
for whom. A competitive market is a more practical, effective institution than its
vastly under-rated reputation would indicate.
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APPENDIX 1
UNITED STATES STEM CORPORATION PRODUCTION
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL UNITED STATES
PRODUCTION
PRODUCT
Iron Ore
Pig Iron
Ingots & Steel for Castings
All Finished Rolled
Products
Heavy Products
Rails
Shapes
Plates 9.
Other Hot Rolled
Products
Sheets
Merchant Bars
Reinforcing Bars
Strip
Wire Rods
Further Finished
Products
Tin and Terne
Plate
Wire Nails
Seamless Tubes
NoT--Sources are indicated
wise indicated.
19011.
45.1
43.22.
65.7
50.1
59.8
62.2
64.6
19111
45.8
45.42.
53.9
YEAR
19203. 19303.
40.0 41.3
39.42- 40.22.
45.8 41.2
19404.
46.25.
38.72.
34.2
19484-
43.15.
35.92a.
33.1
45.7 41.6 36.6 32.76. 31.36a-
56.1
47.0
43.8
58.1 51.2 53.8 49.0
43.9 44.6 42.3 42.9
f 53.2 31.1
39.8 38.17
.
1,47.8 J I, 21.8
21.5 18.8
26.5
18.9
77.6 64.7 56.0 46.1 32.7
73.0 60.7 45.1 37.5 34.48.
65.8 51.4 54.0 44.6 34.5
48.8
19.0
21.7
22.1
18.9
40.2
38.48.
40.1
45.0
by the note references at the column heads unless other-
1. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). Vol. 3
of Defendant's Exhibits, pp. 69, 71, 73.
2. Includes ferro-alloys.
2a. Excludes ferro-alloys.
3. ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORTS, AmEmIcA IRON & STEEL INSTITUTE covering
years listed.
4. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Study of Monwpoly Power of the Coln-
-mittee on the Judiciary, H.R., 81st Cong., 2d Sess. Serial No. 14, Part 4B, Steel
Exhibits 659-660 (1950).
5. Compiled from ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN IRON AND
STEEL INSTITUTE and ANNUAL REPORTS OF U.S. STEEL CORPORATION.
6. Includes all finished steel products produced for sale.
6a. Includes all finished steel products shipped.
7. Includes black plate for tinning.
8. Does not include terne plate.
9. Includes sheared and universal plates.
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